4:Grajdanzev--11-14 S-4 (no date) 1942 Formosans-1-6
116, 175, 563

"Special circumstances contributed to the transformation of Taiwan into a Chinese island. In 1644 China was invaded by the Manchus. The Ming Dynasty was overthrown in the north, but the struggle continued for many years in the south and the population suffered all the horrors of the war. As a consequence more than 100,000 Chinese, according to some reports, fled to Taiwan, which by that time was well known to the inhabitants of Fukien and Canton as the base of operations by Japanese and Chinese pirates alike. This mass emigration to Taiwan changed the character of the island. The newcomers were resolute people, ready to fight aborigines and Manchus, and in their wake thousands of other Chinese followed annually from the densely populated southern provinces.

During the 16th and 17th centuries European Powers laid the foundations of their present Asiatic colonial possessions. Java became a Dutch colony, the Philippine Islands Spanish, and the Portuguese succeded [sic] in acquiring a base at Macao. Rivalry was keen and, after unsuccessful attempts to drive the Portuguese out of Macao, the Dutch established a base on the southwestern shore of Taiwan in 1624, near the present town of Tainan. They began to extend their control over the adjacent territory, to convert the aborigines to Protestantism, to tax the people, to encourage the planting of sugar cane and to develop the production of camphor. Dutch mastery over the island was contested by the Spaniards who in 1626 built Fort San Salvador at Keelung, in the north of the island, and three years later Fort San Domingo at Tamsui, in the northwest. At the same time Spanish missionaries also started preaching the Gospel, trying to convert the natives to Catholicism. But the Dutch drove out the Spanish soldiers (1) by military force

1. The following correspondence between the Dutch and Spanish commanders is of interest, because it aptly illustrates the spirit of the time:

To Gonsolo Portilio,
Governor of the Spanish fortress in the island of Kelung.
Sir.

I have the honor to communicate to you that I have received the command of a considerable naval and military force with the view of making me master by civil means or otherwise of the fortress Santissima Trinidad in the isle of Kelung of which your Excellency is the Governor. [12]

In accordance with the usage of Christian nations to make known their intentions before commencing hostilities, I now summon your Excellency to surrender. If your Excellency is disposed to lend an ear to the terms of capitulation which we offer and to make delivery to me of the fortress of Santissima Trinidad and other citadels, your Excellency and your troops will be treated in good faith according to the usages and customs of war, but if your Excellency feigns to be deaf to this command there will be no other remedy than recourse to arms. I hope that your Excellency will give

4:Grajdanzev--11-14 S-4 (no date) 1942 Formosans-3
116, 175, 563

careful consideration to the contents of this letter and avoid the useless effusion of blood, and I trust that without delay in a few words you will make known to me your intentions.

May God protect your Excellency many years.
The friend of your Excellency
Paulus Tradenius.

Fort Zelandia, August 26th, 1641.
To the Governor of Taiwan.
Sir,

I have duly received your communication of August 26th, and in response I have the honor to point out that as becomes a good Christian who respects the oath he has made before his king, I cannot and I will not surrender the forts demanded by your Excellency, as I and my garrison have determined to defend them. I am accustomed to find myself before great armies, and I have engaged in numerous battles in Flanders as well as other countries, and so I beg of you not to take the trouble of writing me further letters of like tenor. May each one defend himself as best he can. We are Spanish Christians and God in whom we trust is our protector.

May the Lord have mercy upon you.
Written in our principal fortress
San Salvador the 6th of September 1641.
(Signed) Gonsalo Portilis.

[12] and to all appearances became the sole masters of Taiwan. Had they retained the island, it might have become a base for further penetration into China and Japan. As has been mentioned, China was at that time in a turbulent state. As the conquering Manchus advanced southwards, many more Chinese fled to Taiwan. In the southwest resistance to the invading forces was carried on first by Cheng Chi-lung. Originally a tailor, he later migrated to Japan, where he married a Japanese girl. He then became a famous pirate and finally, as was often the case in China, a high official. His son Cheng Ch'eng-kung, better known as Koxinga, continued the struggle, but, being hard pressed by Manchu forces, decided to give up Fukien. On April 30, 1661, Koxinga, with a large fleet and an army of 25,000, appeared at Zeelandia, chief Dutch port in Taiwan, where he was supported by the discontented Chinese population. Only nine years before, there had been a serious uprising against the Dutch as a result of oppressive taxes and heavy export duties, and though the rebel-[13]lion had been crushed, the resentment remained. Koxinga besieged the fortress, which was garrisoned by 2,200 Dutch soldiers and a few settlers, and after a long siege the Dutch surrendered on February 1,1662, bringing to an end the attempt to secure a European base for an advance to the north. Within a few years all vestiges of Dutch influence had disappeared, the forts fell to ruins and the aboriginal converts returned to their old practices.

The reasons for the failure of both the Dutch and Spaniards are not far to seek. The purpose of colonial possessions was trade, whilst preaching the Gospel was only an auxiliary method of subjugation and control. The needs of the local inhabitants were neglected—they were looked upon only as a source of income. The smallness of military forces stationed in the colonies and the great distance from bases prevented speedy reinforcement of the garrison, and the Dutch were compelled to give up in the face of the strong native force.

In 1683 the island fell into the hands of Manchu rulers, and for 212 years it was a part of the Manchu Empire. But little attention was paid by the rulers to the island, for it was made only a _fu_—a prefecture—of Fukien province, the governors of which did not trouble themselves with visits to a distant island.

The population was unruly and turbulent. The Chinese inhabitants consisted of two groups which did not easily mingle with one another. The earlier settlers were the Hakkas from Kwangtung province, the remnants of the native tribes which were sinified to some degree as they came under Chinese domination. Their name itself means 'stranger', and in China they were the pariahs of society. In the new possession they were able to secure better conditions, and it has been estimated that one third of the Hakkas in Kwangtung province emigrated to Taiwan. (2). Another group was made up of emigrants from the opposite shore of Fukien province, called Puntis. Both groups of the Chinese population brought

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2. Davidson, J., _The Island of Formosa,_ 1903, p. 8.

4:Grajdanzev--11-14 S-4 (no date) 1942 Formosans-6
116, 175, 563

with them the customs, beliefs, and superstitions which they had [14] known on the continent and thus reproduced on the island the life they had led in China. The Chinese in South China, for example, were organised into clans, and the population of Taiwan was likewise thus divided.

From the occupation of the island by Koxinga to the coming of the Japanese some 220 years later the Chinese were constantly at war with the natives who had once occupied the whole island, including the fertile plains of the west, and who were now forced to give up their lands. Some of the aborigines were absorbed by the Chinese, some annihilated, while the most indomitable were driven step by step into the mountainous regions. As a result of this cruel treatment, they developed a hafred for the Chinese and tried to kill them at every opportunity, raiding their villages or hunting the inhabitants down when they dared to penetrate the dense forests in search of camphor trees. The Chinese organized some kind of semi-volunteer guards, whose duty it was to keep the 'savages' within a pale. But the 'savages', composed of many tribes, were fighting not only against the Chinese, but also among themselves and as a result of these unfavorable conditions, their numbers either remained stationary or decreased, while the Chinese population on the plains, living if not a life of opulence, yet under comparatively easy conditions, was increasing by natural growth as well as by immigration from China. At the end of the period of Chinese sovereignty, the aborigines, who had once made up the whole population of the island, formed only about three to four per cent of the total, so that the island acquired an entirely Chinese character."

"The Chinese, however, were not a homogeneous group with identical interests. The difference between the Hakkas and the Fukienese has already been mentioned [see category 116, p. 13--Analyst] and this difference often found expression in bloody conflicts. Within each of these two groups clans were fighting one another, often for seemingly trivial reasons but most commonly for land and for influence in local affairs. There was also cleavage between the old settlers who possessed the land and the newcomers who had been compelled to rent it and borrow money at exorbitant [15] rates. Finally, there were frequent rebellions against the local officials of the Manchu government who ruled the island with the support of 10,000 to 15,000 poorly trained and badly paid soldiers.

At the time of conquest the Manchu rulers did not resemble the Chinese either in appearance or in language. The Manchus were a warlike Tungus tribe inhabiting North Manchuria and now almost completely assimilated by the Chinese. At least during the first century after the invasion they did not speak the Chinese language, far less the Fukienese dialect. The Hakkas hardly understood the Puntis, and both, as a rule, did not understand the numerous aboriginal dialects. The officials communicated with the population only through interpreters who often abused their position, a bribe being sufficient to change the interpretation of a case before the mandarin. These mandarins and their entourage, coming from distant Peking, looked upon Taiwan as a source of speedy enrichment, and at times their exactions and misrule became so oppressive that revolts followed. A Chinese saying of those days concerning Taiwan sums up the situation:

4:Grajdanzev--14-15 S-4 (no date) 1942 Formosans-2

116, 175, 563

'Every three years a disorder, and every five years a rebellion.' (1) Indeed the history

1. Quoted by De Bunsen, 'Formosa,' Geographical Journal, 1928, p. 268.

of Taiwan is represented by some writers as a succession of rebellions."

4:Grajdanzev--20-21 S-4 (no date) 1942 Formosans
116, 175, 563, 177.65 Japan
636.65

"Thus Taiwan became the first Japanese colony. Many problems faced the new masters of the island, one being the aborigines and the territory occupied by them. About half of the island, sparsely populated by aboriginal tribes, was practically outside Chinese authority and the occupation of the western part by Japanese in 1895 did not bring them nearer to [21] the solution of the problem. It took decades of effort and even now is not finally solved. The Chinese part was easier to control, but several years were spent in the suppression of rebellions, and special measures were required to keep order among the population. Even the pacified population presented many problems. They were foreign in speech, in customs, outlook and allegiance, and no policy worked out in advance could be applied at once."

4: Grajdanzev--29-30 S-4 (no date) 1942 Formosans
116, 162, 563

"Now let us return to the ratios of births and deaths given in [30] the preceding pages. For 1937 the birth rate for the Chinese was 45.9, for the Japanese 28.5; the death rate for the Chinese was 20.4, for the Japanese 9.6. One possible explanation of this striking difference might be that the age and sex distribution of the Chinese and Japanese on the island is quite different, or that there were more Japanese men than women and that these were represented chiefly by middle-aged groups. But such an explanation breaks down in the face of the facts. There are in Taiwan 111 Japanese males per 100 Japanese females, as compared with 105 Chinese males per 100 Chinese females--too small a difference to account for the difference in birth rates. We have unfortunately no age statistics for Taiwan's population which distinguish between Japanese and Chinese population. However, the following calculation will throw some light on the age composition of the Japanese on the island: in 1937 the Japanese population of Taiwan constituted 0.41 per cent of the population of Japan proper, and Japanese children of school age in Taiwan amounted to 0.393 per cent of the children of school age in Japan proper. The proportion of Japanese juvenile population in Taiwan is therefore almost the same as in Japan. The only possibility of a significant difference in the age structure of the two groups may be that there are proportionately fewer aged Japanese in Taiwan than in Japan, but on the whole the age composition of the population approximates that of Japan."

4:Grajdanzev--30-31 S-4 (no date) 1942 Formosans-1-2

116, 162, 165, 171, 563

"The real explanation of the striking difference in birth and death rates is that the Japanese and the Chinese on the island form two separate groups, the living conditions and customs of which are completely different. But the figures reveal more than this. The birth rate of the Japanese in Taiwan is only slightly below that of the Japanese in Japan Proper, while the death rate of the Japanese in Japan is 17.0 (1937) and in Taiwan only 9.6 To some degree this may be explained by the fact that there are a smaller number of aged Japanese on the island, but this alone is not sufficient. It is well known that in the same population different social classes have different death rates. The social composition of the Japanese [31] on the island is such that they are better off than the Japanese in Japan, to say nothing of the Chinese in Taiwan, whose death rate is more than double that of the Japanese. The Japanese on the island live under better sanitary conditions, are better fed, have better medical treatment and more leisure than the masses of the Chinese. This does not mean, of course, that the death rate of the Chinese is stable: it is falling, and this fall, typical of all colonial countries similarly situated, is probably due to improved methods of combatting epidemic diseases.

4:Grajdanzev--30-31 S-4 (no date) 1942 Formosans-2

116, 162, 165, 171, 563

Death Rates In Some Tropical Colonies
(per thousand)

	1911-13	1921-25	1926-30	1931-35	1937
Taiwan	...	24.0	22.0	20.6	19.3
Palestine	...	23.7	24.3	21.0	15.0 (1938)
Philippines	19.1	18.9	19.7	18.5	18.8
Ceylon	31.8	27.8	25.1	24.7	21.7
Straits Settlements	40.0	28.9	30.7	24.7	21.3

As regards mortality, Taiwan is in about the same position as other colonies, a fact which suggests that living conditions are comparable to those in any other colony named above."

4:Grajdanzev--32-34 S-4 (no date) 1942 Formosans-1-5
116, 162, 171, 463, 563

"Even in advanced countries occupational statistics are not precise, and in the colonies they are far less reliable. Nevertheless, if one wants to determine only the general characteristics of the population, occupational statistics for Taiwan reveal something. The following table divides the population into such broad categories as 'occupied in agriculture and forestry', 'occupied in industry and mining', etc. The division is given for the whole population and also, for the Chinese and the Japanese separately. The year taken is 1930, because no later figures are available, but it will be shown later that no great changes have taken place since that time. Unlike Korea, where the members of the family who do not take part in work are included in the same occupational group as that of the head of the family, in Taiwan they are registered as having 'no occupation'.

Occupational Statistics For Taiwan, 1930
(in thousands)

	Agriculture and forestry	Fishing	Industry and mining	Trade	Communication	Public serv. & prof.	Others	No Occup.	Total
Japanese	4.4	1.6	15.2	18.1	9.1	37.6	4.5	137.7	228.2
Natives	1 191.7	26.8	144.2	151.0	49.8	37.4	67.6	2,645.1	4,313.6
Total (incl. others)*	1,197.1	28.6	173.6	178.3	63.1	76.0	73.4	2,802.4	4,592.5

* Includes 'foreigners', chiefly Chinese from China proper.

4. Gradjdanzev--32-34 S-4 (no date) 1942 Formosans-2
116, 162, 171, 463, 563

The same table is given below in percentages, taking the number of those occupied as 100 For the sake of comparison corresponding figures for Japan proper for the same year are given: [33]

Occupational Distribution Of Taiwan
(percentages, 1930)

	Agric. and forestry	Fishing	Industry and mining	Trade	Communications	Public serv. & prof.	Others	Total occupied
Taiwan								
Japanese	4.8	1.8	16.8	20.0	10.1	41.5	5.0	100.0
Natives	71.4	1.6	8.6	9.0	3.0	2.2	4.1	100.0
All, incl. others	67.0	1.6	9.7	10.0	3.5	4.2	4.1	100.0
Japan proper (1930)	47.7	1.8	20.0	15.1	3.7	6.9	4.5	100.0

In a condensed form this table indicates to us the most important problems of Taiwan. Taking the native population, we see that almost three-fourths are occupied in agriculture. Forestry as a rule serves only as subsidiary occupation to agriculture. At the same time only 8.6 per cent are occupied in industry and mining, and this also includes those occupied in domestic industries where the productivity of labor is almost as low as in Chinese agriculture. At the same time there are more persons occupied in trade in the broad sense than in industry (9.0 and 8.6 per cent respectively) while only three

4:Grajdanzev--32-34 S-4 (no date) 1942 Formosans-3
116, 162, 171, 463, 563

per cent are occupied in transportation. This illustrates the low level of economic development of the country. In this respect comparison with Japan is interesting. Only a few decades ago Japan herself was at about the same stage of economic development as China. Now, we see that less than half of her population are engaged in agriculture and 20 per cent in industry and mining.

The occupational statistics prove once more that there are two distinct groups in the population; 41.5 per cent of the Japanese, as compared with only 2.2 per cent for the natives, are occupied in public service and the professions, i.e. they form the backbone of the administrative services of the island. We shall see later that only the lowest positions in these services are open to the Chinese. Almost 17 per cent of the Japanese are occupied in industry, and they occupy all the key positions. About 18 per cent of them are occupied in trade and 10 per cent in communications. Comparison with figures for 1905 indicates furthermore that no substantial changes have taken place since then. [34]

	Agric. and forestry	Industry and mining	Commerce and communic.	Public service	Other occupations
Chinese					
1905	75.5	6.1	8.2	1.4	8.8
1930	73.0	8.6	12.2	2.2	4.1

4:Grajdanzev--32-34 S-4 (no date) 1942 Formosans-4

116, 162, 171, 463, 563

	Agric. and forestry	Industry and mining	Commerce and communic.	Public service	Other occupations
Japanese					
1905	*	23.5	32.5	37.8	6.2
1930	*	16.8	30.1	41.5	11.6

* Included in 'other occupations.'

More than 75 per cent of the Chinese were occupied in agriculture in 1905, and 73 per cent in 1930; there was a slight rise in the number occupied in industry—from 6.1 to 8.6—and a more pronounced increase of those occupied in trade. As is well known, trade is the refuge of the unemployed and under-employed and its rapid growth as compared with other professions is hardly a sign of strength.

In twenty-five years the number of Japanese occupied in government administration rose from 37.8 per cent to 41.5 per cent. The fall in the percentage of those occupied in industry may be due to the fact that in the period from 1896 to 1905 very many Japanese were obsessed with the idea of making money in Taiwan in the shortest possible time. Since then the potentialities of the island have become better known, large business organizations have squeezed out the independent ventures. In any case these figures illustrating the changes in Taiwan in twenty-five years do not show that with the passing of time the occupational composition of the Chinese and of the Japanese of the island tends to become similar. If data were available for each occupation showing how many Japanese

4:Grajdanzev--32-34 S-4 (no date) 1942 Formosans-5
116, 162, 171, 463, 563

and how many Chinese are in important executive positions and how many in subordinate positions, the gap would appear much wider. Unfortunately, direct data are not available, but we shall see later that there is no indication that the division is becoming less sharp."

4:Grajdanzev--86 [21 S-4 (no date) 1942 Formosans
116, 228, 471, 473, 563

"As to the other fishing enterprises, their relative strength may be presented in the following manner:

Fishing Enterprises in Taiwan

	Number of firms	Nominal capital (1,000 yen)	Paid-up capital (1,000 yen)	Average paid-up capital per company (1,000 yen)
Japanese corporations with offices in Japan	2	101,500	65,500	32,750
Japanese corporations with offices in Taiwan	28	5,972	3,044	109
Other firms (mostly Chinese)	21	429	399	19

In this field the Chinese can hardly compete with the Japanese because of their lack of capital (1).

2

1. It is interesting to note that, according to the last census, out of 82,338 Chinese fishermen 16,382 were employers, while among 5,045 Japanese only 101 were employers. Evidently, the Chinese 'employer' had one to three workers, while the Japanese employer was a person or firm of considerable means."

4:Grajdanzev--98 S-4 (no date) 1942 Formosans -1-2
116, 257, 477, 563

"Before the Japanese occupation sugar production was carried on in small Chinese enterprises. But these enterprises with their primitive technique, animal power and low-quality products, were compelled to give ground step by step before the modern mills constructed and operated by the Japanese companies. The rapid extinction of these small enterprises and the growth of production of the modern mills may be seen from the following table.

Production of Sugar in Taiwan
(tons)

Year (Nov.- Oct.)	In modern mills	In improved mills	In primitive mills	Total
1905	4,535	385	44,659	49,579
1915	187,839	11,166	9,463	208,468
1917	409,165	26,560	22,367	458,092
1921	241,169	5,217	6,348	252,734
1925	467,264	4,824	7,451	479,539
1927	402,611	3,343	5,186	411,140
1929	777,931	5,776	5,621	789,328
1930	798,304	7,050	5,130	810,484
1932	977,239	6,744	5,065	989,048
1933	616,840	10,070	6,814	633,724

4:Grajdanzev--98 S-4 (no date) 1942 Formosans-2
116, 257, 477, 563

Production of Sugar in Taiwan [Cont.]
(tons)

Year (Nov.-Oct)	In modern mills	In improved mills	In primitive mills	Total
1934	634,403	4,721	7,919	647,043
1935	942,712	9,994	12,946	965,652
1936	880,552	10,402	10,725	901,679
1937	987,451	10,423	9,478	1,007,352
1938	...	...	...	989,778
1939	...	...	...	1,377,000

From this it appears that while in 1905 only nine per cent of the sugar was produced in modern mills, in 1937 these produced ninety-eight per cent of the total. Primitive mills and the so-called 'improved' mills had inevitably to lose the position they occupied."

4:Grajdanzev--98-99 S-4 (no date) 1942 Formosans-1-2
116, 177, 257, 433, 473, 563

"Production of sugar in modern mills is concentrated in the hands of nine Japanese corporations, [99] and of these, six produce ninety-seven per cent of all the sugar produced in modern mills and ninety-five per cent of all that produced in Taiwan. In the table on page 100 information is given concerning each of these six largest corporations. Unfortunately this information is not complete. These corporations are closely connected with many other enterprises in Taiwan and also have enterprises in the Pacific Islands under Japanese mandate, in Java and in other southern colonies (1). Many of these enterprises have nothing to do with sugar. But even so, the information given is interesting because it does throw some light on their activities. The paid-up capital and reserves of three of these corporations is about ¥100 million each. The amount of reserves is explained by the remarkable rate of profit which they receive—34 to 40 per cent is 'normal' for them. A lower rate of profit, as in the case of Ensuiko Seito Corporation (20.2 per cent) may be explained by the fact that the corporation has recently doubled its capital, investing it in new enterprises which do not yet bring profit. Thus the rate of profit in the sugar industry is extraordinarily high for all companies. It was shown above that the farmers did not receive any benefits either from the increase of the sugar

1. They also have refineries in Japan proper. Sugar produced in Taiwan is not refined there.

4:Grajdanzev--98-99 S-4 (no date) 1942 Formosans-2
116, 177, 257, 433, 473, 563

content of the cane, nor from the increase of protection; it now becomes clear that these benefits fell to the manufacturers, for only in this way were these huge profits possible (2).

2. But a certain part of these profits is the result of higher prices paid by the Japanese population for the benefit of these companies, protected by the tariff wall."

4:Grajdanzev--110-111 S-4 (no date) 1942 Formosans-1-3
116, 463, 471, 563, 655, 177.47 Japan
636.47

"Our analysis of industry and mining must not be limited to a survey of present conditions and the plans of the government, etc. Properly speaking it should only begin here. The population of Taiwan is about five per cent Japanese and about ninety-five per cent Chinese and aborigines. In order to evaluate the place of these two groups in industry and mining we should know wage levels and working conditions as well as the all-important question of who are the entrepreneurs and who the wage earners. Unfortunately, some of these questions cannot be answered because of the absence of information.

The latest available report concerning the nationality of capital in Taiwan's companies refers to the years 1929.

Distribution of Corporate Capital in Taiwan by Nationality in 1929
(1,000 yen)

	Japanese	Chinese	Other*	Total
Agriculture	4,434	4,962	4	9,399
Industry	180,497	16,786	1,658	198,941
Commerce	23,128	28,082	2,033	53,242
Communications	3,186	2,571	25	5,781
Fisheries	2,258	1,190	20	3,467

4:Grajdanzev--110-111 S-4 (no date) 1942 Formosans-2
116, 463, 471, 563, 655, 177.47 Japan
636.47

Distribution of Corporate Capital in Taiwan by Nationality in 1929 [Cont.]
(1,000 yen)

	Japanese	Chinese	Other*	Total
Mining	12,243	3,441	1,422	17,107
Total	225,745	57,033	5,161	287,939

* Chiefly Chinese from the mainland, citizens of the Chinese Republic.

The share of the Japanese was therefore 90.7 per cent in industry and 71.6 per cent in mining, while the corresponding shares for the Chinese were 8.5 per cent and 20.1 per cent. It is true that these figures do not include individual enterprises, which are chiefly Chinese, but it is quite evident that their inclusion would not greatly change the picture because the average capital of such enterprises is very small. On the other [111] hand this table does not include government enterprises which should be considered for all practical purposes as Japanese enterprises (the managerial staff is Japanese and the profits may be transferred to Japan at any time), and the capital of these government enterprises is huge. As is seen from the table, the capital of all corporations was about ¥288 million in 1929, yet in the same year the capital of the state railways alone was ¥122 million. Beside railways the government has many enterprises of all kinds. Since 1929 the situation has further changed to the disadvantage of the Chinese group for in the

4:Grajdanzev--110-111 S-4 (no date) 1942 Formosans-3
116, 463, 471, 563, 655, 177.47 Japan
636.47

last few years, as was shown above, huge new companies have been established and the capital of old ones increased. The new companies are Japanese. In 1929, for example, the capital of the Japanese companies occupied in the fisheries was ¥2, 258,000; in 1939 two Japanese companies with headquarters in Japan proper, whose capital is ¥65,500,000 were operating in Taiwan. Of course, only a part of this capital is sunk in their Taiwan enterprises, but it is clear that the situation in 1939, in this as well as in many other respects, is less favorable to the Chinese than it was ten years before.

The same thing has occurred in mining, where the total capital is now ¥46.6 million, instead of ¥17.1 million as in 1929. The increase is due to the activities of the Japanese Koyo Kogyo, Taiwan Kogyo, and Keelung Tanko corporations."

4:Grajdanzev--111-112 S-4 (no date) 1942 Formosans
116, 463, 471, 563, 477

"A similar expansion [similar to that in mining--analyst] has taken place in industry, where all large new enterprises are owned by Japanese who make up only five per cent of the population, but now own at least ninety-five per cent of the capital in Taiwan's industry and more than ninety per cent of the capital in mining. But if one takes into consideration the fact that the Japanese enterprises are modern, while those of the Chinese are small and have more primitive equipment, (1) it becomes clear that the share of the Japanese enterprises in production is even greater than comparison of the respective holdings would indicate. Furthermore, the shares of corporations in Taiwan are not subject to free purchase and sale. These are monopolistic [112] organizations, and shares in them are not offered on the open market but are held by the big corporations of Japan."

1. Compare the data on sugar mills given above.

4:Grajdanzev--112 S-4 (no date) 1942 Formosans -1-2
116, 171, 471, 563, 477, 655, 177.47 Japan
636.47

"It may be of some interest to compare the share of native corporations in the total corporate capital of Taiwan with their share in Korea, for which the most recent data is available:

Percentage Share of the Native Corporations in the Total Capital of Corporations

	Taiwan, 1929 Per cent	Korea 1938 Per cent
Agriculture	52.8	20.7
Industry	8.5	6.6
Commerce	52.7	19.1
Communications	44.5	7.5
Fisheries	34.3	6.3
Mining	20.1	6.8
Total	19.8	11.3

Source for Korea: Kokusei gurafu, April 1940.

It is evident from this table that in Korea the occupation of commanding positions by Japanese capital had proceeded much further by 1938 than it had in Taiwan by 1929. Native capital was strongest in Taiwan in 1929 in agriculture, commerce, communications and fisheries and it is interesting to note that Korean capital was most strongly placed

4:Grajdanzev--112 S-4 (no date) 1942 Formosans-2
116, 171, 471, 563, 477, 655, 177.47 Japan
636.47

just in these branches in 1920. This is not a coincidence. The squeezing out of the native capital usually begins in industry and mining (2) and reaches commerce and agriculture

> 2. Actually it began with communications. The railroads in both colonies are in Japanese hands, but since they belong chiefly to the government they are not included in the above figures.

only at a later stage. In Korea native capital is now only eleven per cent of total corporate capital. and there is no reason to expect that the proportion is higher in Taiwan.

The answer to the first question as to the nationality of capital in industry and mining in Taiwan is thus quite clear—from ninety to ninety-five per cent of this capital belongs to the Japanese."

4:Grajdanzev--112-113 S-4 (no date) 1942 Formosans
116, 171, 563, 471

"According to Takahashi, (1) industry in Taiwan [113] is chiefly in Japanese hands because

1. Op. cit. p. 434 et seq.

(1) the Japanese are able to organize modern enterprises; (2) the Chinese are chiefly concentrated in domestic industry; (3) the national characteristics of the Chinese are such that they are unable to organize corporations; (4) any accumulations of capital which they may have are small because they came to the island recently and their chief occupation is agriculture; (5) they cannot compete in the Japanese market with the Japanese because they do not know the market; (6) in those cases where they do organize a corporation their aim is to get profits quickly, and this brings ruin to the corporation. This is a familiar argument in colonial countries. We make only a few comments below.

It is argued that the Chinese do not have the accumulation of capital necessary for modern industry, that they came to Taiwan recently (!) and that their chief occupation is agriculture. But in 1900-05, when the Japanese began to build up the industrial enterprises of Taiwan, the chief occupation of the Japanese in Japan was also agriculture. It would be a mistake to suppose that they exported a huge amount of capital to Taiwan. This question will be touched upon in the chapter on the external trade of Taiwan, where we shall show that the capital of corporations in Taiwan was 'created' chiefly in Taiwan itself."

4:Grajdanzev--113 S-4 (no date) 1942 Formosans
116, 463, 471, 563, 177.47 Japan
636.47

"Our first question is now answered: the Chinese as a group receive very little from Taiwan's industry and mining in the form of interest on capital or entrepreneurs' profits. Any advantages which they may derive from these industries arise then chiefly from their position as workers. Let us see now what they receive in this capacity. In 1936, out of 81,589 workers occupied in industrial enterprises with five or more workers or having a prime-mover, 76,251 (93.5 per cent) were Chinese—almost the same percentage as in the population of Taiwan. The remaining 6.5 per cent were chiefly Japanese."

4:Grajdanzev--116 S-4 (no date) 1942 Formosans-1-2
116, 171, 435, 465, 563

"As is well known, Japan is not a country of high wages. Yet wages there are from two to three times higher than the wages of the Chinese in Taiwan and do not seem to have been an obstacle to the development of industry. The wage level is closely connected with the level of retail prices and this we give below.

Retail Prices in Taihoku, May 1939
(sen)

Sweet potatoes	(per kin)	6.4
Rice, horai	(per kin)	11
Sugar	(per kin)	29
Pork, average quality	(per kin)	43
Miso, per 100 momme	(0.827 lb.)	8
Fish	(per kin)	18-22
Eggs, each		6
Soap, per piece		10-17
Matches, per box		1.4
Firewood, per 100 kin		180
Muslin (per yard)		134

Now, let us take two workers—one skilled and one day laborer. For the skilled workers the average daily wage in the second half of 1938 was ¥1.43 per day, (1) for an

1. This is a simple arithmetic average of 60 different

4:Grajdanzev--116 S-4 (no date) 1942 Formosans-2
116, 171, 435, 465, 563

> categories of workers in Taihoku; in so far as highly paid categories are small in numbers, the weighted average would be lower. The official estimate of the average wage for Taihoku is ¥1.27.

unskilled worker ¥0.85. The average family in Taiwan consists of five to six persons. According to the prices given above, the skilled worker can buy with his daily wages, for example, either 17.2 lb. of rice or 4.4 lb. of pork, or 6.5 lb. of sugar. An unskilled worker can make such purchases as 10.2 lb. of rice, or 2.6 lb. of pork, or 3.9 lb. of sugar. By whatever standards, it is evident that the wages of the workers are very low.

The wages of Japanese workers, on the other hand, are at least double those of the Chinese for the same job. For Taihoku the official estimate of the average wage for the Chinese is ¥1.27, for Japanese, ¥2.41 (2). It is thus not profitable for the Japanese

> 2. A simple arithmetic average for 25 occupations of the Japanese in Taihoku gives ¥2.65.

entrepreneurs to use Japanese workers extensively."

4:Grajdanzev--117, S-4 (no date) 1942 Formosans
116, 465, 472, 511, 563

"We saw previously that the development of modern industry in Taiwan did not benefit the Chinese as entrepreneurs. Now it becomes evident that it brought very little to them as workers. If we use Engel's ratio of sixty per cent as an estimate of the share of wages spent on food in low-wage countries, it appears that the wages of the unskilled worker in Taiwan can purchase about one pound of rice per day for each member of his family."

4:Grajdanzev--119 [2] S-4 (no date) 1942 Formosans
116, 171, 497, 511, 563, 177.49 Japan
636.49

"From the table given above [see table on page 118 under category 116--analyst] we see that a Japanese makes almost five times as many trips a year as does a Taiwanese --whereas the movement of the freight appears relatively as large as in Japan. The movement of passengers reflects the conditions of life of the natives while the movement of freight in Taiwan is the movement of Japanese freight to and from ports--coal, sugar, rive, fertilizer, lumber, and sugar cane (1) (in the order of freight carried)--

1. Sugar cane is in sixth place because the bulk of its [sic] transported on special railroads.

which, as will be shown later in more detail, serve chiefly the Japanese economic machine. The statistics of revenue show that the average cost per ton of freight in Taiwan is less than in Japan (¥2.26 as compared with ¥2.34). It may be said that this is quite reasonable because in Taiwan average distance over which the freight is moved is less. On the other hand, the average passenger cost per trip in Taiwan is twice as high. In spite of the smaller scale of operation, the railways of Taiwan bring a net return of eight to nine per cent as compared with six per cent in Japan (1937)."

4:Grajdanzev--124-125 S-4 (no date) 1942 Formosans-1-2
116, 162, 205, 563

"On several occasions it has been pointed out that in Taiwan there are two groups of the population, Japanese and Chinese, with quite different levels of income. Let us compare these.

Use of Communication Facilities by the Japanese and the Chinese in Taiwan in 1938

	Total sent (1.000)		Per capita	
	By Japanese	By Chinese	Japanese	Chinese
Letters etc.	50,879	30,957	165.0	5.7
Parcels	681.2	174.0	2.20	0.032
Telegrams	1.736.2	366.1	5.560	0.068
Telephones	15,510 (units)	6,741 (units)	0.05010	0.00125

Source: Taiwan Jijo, per capita figures calculated.

It is clear that the average used in the table on page 123 are misleading, for the bulk of the letters, parcels, and telegrams are sent by the small group of Japanese living in the island, just as most of the telephones are used by them. On the average a Japanese sends 29 times as many letters, 69 times as many parcels, 82 times as many telegrams and has 40 times as many telephones as does a Chinese. An important [125] part of the letters, telegrams and telephones naturally serve official functions. It is now clear why the net-

4:Grajdanzev--124-125 S-4 (no date) 1942 Formosans-2

116, 162, 205, 563

work of post offices and telegraph offices is growing so slowly--65.4 per cent of all the Japanese on the island live in nine cities and 83 per cent in 57, all of which are well supplied with these facilities."

4:Grajdanzev--125 S-4 (no date) 1942 Formosans
116, 167, 171, 205, 563

"It is also noteworthy that the Japanese in Taiwan send on the average many more letters, parcels, telegrams and have better telephone facilities than the Japanese in Japan proper. This is an indirect proof that they are much better off than the average Japanese at home, a fact to be kept in mind when one is considering the causes for the failure of mass Japanese emigration to the island. The Japanese come to the island in order to secure a better living in Taiwan than they had at home, and not to compete with the low-paid Chinese."

4:Grajdanzev--126 S-4 (no date) 1942 Formosans
116, 453, 563

"The banking system collects the liquid funds of the inhabitants and transfers them to those who can put up security and are willing to pay a certain rate of interest. Besides the deposits which are brought to them the banks may to a certain degree 'create' deposits. These operations place them at the centre of economic activity and give them power far beyond that which their own capital could otherwise confer. All banks in Taiwan are in Japanese hands. On page 127 we give in tabular form some information concerning each of the banks operating in Taiwan."

4:Grajdanzev--128 S-4 (no date) 1942 Formosans-1-2
116, 453, 458, 511, 563

"The banks enumerated above [see page 127 in category 116--analyst] are Japanese, and the only institutions in which the Chinese have some measure of influence are the credit cooperatives, which will be discussed later. The table below summarizes information on deposits of all financial institutions of Taiwan.

Growth of Deposits of Financial Institutions in Taiwan
(1,000,000 yen)

	1926	1928	1930	1932	1934	1935	1939
Banks	102.9	111.9	101.2	133.2	152.2	173.0	270.3
Post office	9.1	13.3	16.5	18.1	21.4	23.7	34.8*
Credit cooperatives	28.0	34.9	34.6	47.7	65.5	77.9	118.2†
Total	140.0	160.1	152.3	199.0	239.1	274.6	423.3*†

* Post-office savings deposits on Dec. 31, 1938.

†Of which rural credit cooperatives accounted for ¥87,230,000 on Dec. 31, 1938.

The amount of deposits in Taiwan has thus trebled in thirteen years. In order to judge whether this is a sign of a sharp improvement of the economic position of the islanders, it is necessary to know (1) whether the increase in deposits comes chiefly from Japanese or from Chinese sources, (2) whether the increase in deposits of the Chinese is a real

4:Grajdanzev--128 S-4 (no date) 1942 Formosans-2
116, 453, 458, 511, 563

increase, or whether it only reflects a change of habit (it is evident that the transition from subsistence to money economy is bound up with the increase of deposits at the banks), (3) how far this increase may be ascribed to war-time inflation.

We do not have complete data on the distribution of deposits between Japanese and Chinese, but what is available throws some light on the problem.

Distribution of Deposits in Banks and Post Offices
(million yen)

	Banks		Post offices	
	Chinese	Japanese	Chinese	Japanese
1926	33.0	69.8	2.6	6.6
1935	51.2	121.7	4.9	18.8
1938	...	...	6.9	27.9

4:Grajdanzev--129-130 S-4 (no date) 1942 Formosans-1-2
116, 453, 458, 563

"Deposits in cooperatives belong chiefly to the Chinese, but no data are available either on the exact composition by nationality of the depositors or on their number. The table given above shows that between 1926 and 1935 the growth of Japanese banking and postal deposits was more rapid than that of the Chinese and that in 1935 about seventy-two per cent of all deposits in the banks and post offices belonged to the Japanese. But in order to see whether there is a real gain we should know the number of the depositors or the average deposit. We have such data only for the post offices.

Average Amount of Savings per Depositor in Post Offices
(in yen)

	1921	1929	1934	1938	
Japanese	33.3	51.0	146.5	89.5	(1937)*
Chinese	8.2	16.6	14.2	13.8	

* Data for the Japanese beginning with 1936 show a strange change: the number of depositors rises sharply without a corresponding increase in the total amount of the deposits. For 1938 the number of non-Chinese depositors is shown as 394,000, while the whole Japanese population in Taiwan is only 308,000. It may be that the increase of more than 100,000 Japanese depositors with a very small increase in deposits reflects the stationing of a larger number of troops in Taiwan.

4:Grajdanzev--129-130 S-4 (no date) 1942 Formosans-2
116, 453, 458, 563

Calculated from data given in Taiwan Jijo.

Comparison of the deposits of the Japanese and the Chinese shows (1) that the Japanese deposits are from seven to ten times larger on the average than the deposits of the Chinese; (2) that the average size of the Chinese deposits has not shown any increase since 1929, especially if we take the rise in prices into consideration; (3) that the absolute amount of Chinese deposits is so small that it hardly indicates any great prosperity. When the farmer buys fertilizers and sells a larger and larger part of his produce on the market, he will not keep his savings in the form of silver but will prefer to keep it in the bank where it is safer. This is, however, not necessarily a sign of economic improvement.

On the other hand, a comparison of the note issue and the index of wholesale prices suggests that a large part of the increase in deposits in the war years is purely illusory. If a [130] business man is compelled by the conditions obtaining in his business to have in his account a certain sum of money, then with the rise of wholesale prices he has to increase his deposits in order to be able to satisfy his needs to the same extent as before. But this again can hardly be considered as a sign of 'prosperity', at least for the society as a whole."

4:Grajdanzev--130 S-4 (no date) 1942 Formosans-1-2
116, 426, 453, 563, 477

"The money which the banks and credit cooperatives collect is lent to the business men and farmers, and here one finds a great difference in the position of the big firms and the small farmers or artisans. The banks serve chiefly Japanese firms, and their credit requirements differ little from those in Japan. Small business men secure their credit in urban credit societies which sometimes charge as much as thirteen per cent and usually ten per cent, while rural credit societies usually charge twelve per cent and in the worst cases seventeen per cent. (1) But both urban and rural credit societies grant such credit only on good security, so that the demand of many farmers for credit remains unsatisfied and they are compelled to apply for loans to private individuals who charge twenty to twenty-five per cent, and as Takahashi remarks, cases where more than twenty-five per cent is charged are not rare.

This brief survey is sufficient to show that the modern banks in Taiwan help to collect money from the population and loan it at a relatively low rate of interest to the big Japanese firms, while the Chinese have to apply for loans to other sources where they pay two to five times as high a rate of interest as that which the Japanese firms pay.

1. These rates are taken from Sangyo kumiai nenkan, 1938, Tokyo. K. Takahashi asserts that the usual rate for mortgages on real property is 15 per cent, op. cit. p. 601).

4:Grajdanzev--130 S-4 (no date) 1942 Formosans-2
116, 426, 453, 563, 477

The importance of this fact cannot be overemphasized. The Chinese enterprises are unable to compete with the Japanese, not so much because the Chinese are 'unable to organize corporations' on account of their 'national characteristics,' [rationalizations given by Takahashi for the domination of industry by the Japanese see pages 112-113 in category 116--analyst] but because their financing costs them two to five times as much as it does the Japanese enterprises."

4:Grajdanzev--138-139 S-4 (no date) 1942 Formosans-1-2
116, 563, 659, 723, 177.65 Japan
636.65

"The expenditures on the government apparatus, including police, courts, prisons, and pensions are chiefly, in some cases [139] exclusively, expenditures on the Japanese staff and for the benefit of the Japanese. All important government positions are occupied by Japanese and their salaries are much higher than those of the Chinese. Expenditures on roads, railroads, and communications, of course, benefit the local population as well as the Japanese, but as was shown in preceding chapters, these improvements are used chiefly by the Japanese or for commerce with Japan which brings little net gain to the islanders. Expenditures on ports are out of all proportion to the needs of the island. Their function is, as the Japanese openly announce, to serve as a base for the advance to the South, and such expenditures have little to do with the welfare of the islanders. Expenditures on rice control are again expenditures in the interest of Japan proper for this system has in view simply the interest of Japanese. In the war expenditures we have included expenditures on airfields, on Red Cross activities, on air defense and contributions to the war chest of Japan. These expenditures grew from the modest figure of 287,000 yen in 1935 to 21,150,000 yen in 1939; thus Taiwan contributes to the conquest of China by the Japanese. In the war expenditures should be included expenditures on meteorological stations. Their remarkable growth from 73,000 yen in 1935 to 900,000 yen in 1939 is explained not by any interest in meteorological phenomena, but by the

4:Grajdanzev--138-139 S-4 (no date) 1942 Formosans-2
116, 563, 659, 723, 177.65 Japan
636.65

needs of the Japanese military aviation. Taiwan lies in the path of typhoons and information on weather conditions there is of extreme value to the Japanese forces in China."

4:Grajdanzev--140 S-4 (no date) 1942 Formosans
116, 563, 656, 177.47 Japan
636.47

" 'Encouragement of industry', on which the government planned in 1939 to spend 11.5 million yen from the general budget and 6.5 million from local budgets, consists of subsidies to Japanese industrialists and entrepreneurs in general. The budget for 1939, for example, provided for the following grants to Japanese companies: 1,743,000 yen to oil companies, 1,447,000 to shipping lines, 1,640,000 to airlines, 72,000 to private railways, 629,000 to gold producers. It is clear that these expenditures enriching the Japanese entrepreneurs give at best, as was shown above, low-paid work for the Chinese."

4:Grajdanzev--140 [2] S-4 (no date) 1942 Formosans
116, 346, 563, 659, 177.65 Japan
636.65

"The shrines and temples mentioned above are not Chinese temples, but Japanese shrines, including a shrine to the spirits of the war-dead on which 100,000 yen was expended in 1939. It may be interesting to note that construction of Japanese shrine in Taito (1937-1939) was to cost 1,078,000 yen, while the appropriations for the Chinese temple of Confucius in Taihoku (1935-1936) amounted to only 20,000 yen."

4:Grajdanzev--146-147 S-4 (no date) 1942 Formosans -1-2
116, 439, 477, 563, 656, 177.47 Japan
636.47

"Independent trade and foreign business are at an end (1) and the handful of foreigners in Taiwan are in a precarious position. In his [147] book 'Taiwan under Imperialism' Tadao Yanaihara explains this in the following way (2): in their competition with foreign and Chinese merchants the Japanese traders had great capital; they also entered the sphere of production; they had the advantage of the cooperation of the Taiwan Bank; they were helped by state monopolies; they enjoyed subsidies from the state; they were protected by the tariff wall. But nowhere in his book does Professor Yanaihara give proof that the Japanese merchants had greater amounts of capital when their enterprises were organized. The huge capital funds were not brought from Japan; they were created in Taiwan itself. Neither can any reason be found for combination of trade and production

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1. Identical amounts of foreign trade may mean different things for a nation; thus if an American firm buys tea in Taiwan, transports it to the United States in an American ship and sells it to retailers, the net result for the United States is very different from the case where a Japanese firm buys tea in Taiwan, brings it to the United States in Japanese bottoms, and sells it to American retailers.

2. Yanaihara, op. cit., pages 48-49.

4:Grajdanzev--146-147 S-4 (no date) 1942 Formosans -2
116, 439, 477, 563, 656, 177.47 Japan
636.47

as a cause of their success. According to his own statement (op. cit., page 48), the foreign traders and shipping were almost completely driven out (hotondo kuchiku serarete) by 1907. But at that time no Japanese took any part in the production of rice, whereas in tea production Mitsui Bussan Co. and Nozawa have participated only since 1907. As late as 1905 about 90% of the sugar was produced in primitive mills and only 4,535 tons in the mills of the newly-established Japanese enterprises, while the total exports of sugar for 1905 were but 42,600 tons. Pineapples and bananas were unimportant as articles of export in these early years: bananas appeared in the custom reports in 1907 (valued at only 44,129 yen), pineapples to the value of only 18,639 yen were exported in the same year. Since camphor became a monopoly, there is no question of competition with respect to it; while alcohol was practically not exported."

4:Grajdanzev--152-153 S-4 (no date) 1942 Formosans-1-2
116, 273, 511, 563, 439, 565

"The remaining imports — imports for consumption — should be divided, wherever possible, into two parts — consumption by Japanese and consumption by Chinese. Without attempting any detailed analysis we may make a few remarks on the basis of the material available. In 1939, for example, 2 million yen worth of condensed milk was imported, as well as 7 million yen worth of sake and 5 million yen worth of beer, not including local production of sake and beer. Neither sake nor beer are Chinese drinks; they are consumed chiefly by 100,000 Japanese male adults and by the troops stationed there. To take another example, in 1939 48.6 million yen worth of fabrics and clothing, including shoes, hats, gloves, buttons, pearls, combs, bracelets, laces, etc. were imported into Taiwan. From this amount 8.1 million yen worth of gunny sacks should be deducted, leaving a balance of 40.1 million. If Japanese residents were able in 1939 to spend 12 million yen on drinks (not including locally produced and consumed beverages), they probably spent not less than double this sum on clothing, shoes and other personal articles (1) which—with a [153] few unimportant exceptions—are imported from Japan.

1. That this is not an overestimate may be judged from the following figures: 77.2 yen per person per year or about 25 yen per family per month can hardly be considered as excessive for clothing (including shoes, etc.) in a country where, for example, one yard of muslin cost 1.34 yen. In a special investigation conducted in 1937-1938, which covered 355 Japanese families with 1,397 members, the average

4:Grajdanzev--152-153 S-4 (no date) 1942 Formosans-2
116, 273, 511, 563, 439, 565

> monthly income of a family was 184.6 yen, of which 23.6 yen was spent on food, 16.9 yen on lodging, leaving an ample margin for clothing and other expenditures. (Data on budgets from the Toyo keizai tokei geppo, July, 1940). An investigation conducted in Japan proper in 1936-1937, only one year earlier than the investigation in Taiwan mentioned above, gives the average expenditure on clothing of 10.18 yen per month for persons with an average salary of 88.37 yen; for the low income brackets it was 3.43 yen, for higher (about 100 yen), 12.18 yen. In our case the average salary is 184.6 yen, so that an expenditure of 25 yen on clothing is quite probable. See Kakei chosa hokoku, (Naikaku tokei kyoku) Tokyo, March, 1938.

If this is true , then not more than 3 yen per capita were spent on imported clothing by the Chinese in 1939 (2). But, as was pointed out in the preceding pages, the Chinese

> 2. The correctness of our estimate is supported by the budget estimates made by the government officials in 1936 and quoted by Nasu (op. cit.). According to them, the per capita annual expenditure on clothing of a representative Taiwanese farmer was 6.02 yen in 1936. This figure includes imported and locally produced clothing (shoes, hats, etc.) whereas our estimate is for the imported textiles only.

society in Taiwan is not uniform. Its wealthier members spend on clothing many times more than the small farmers, workers, or tenants."

4:Grajdanzev--154-155 S-4 (no date) 1942 Formosans -1-3
116, 171, 465, 511, 556, 563, 177.43 Japan
636.43

"The profits and emoluments which the Japanese get from Taiwan may be divided into two parts, that which they consume in Taiwan itself and that which is sent to Japan or invested in business. Consider first what the Japanese consume on the island. We shall assume that the workers and the lesser officials consume the whole of their income—any error which this hypothesis may involve will be small. Skilled Japanese workers in Taiwan earn about 700-800 yen a year and subordinate officials, who form the bulk of the Japanese population, earn about 1,200-1,500 yen a year. There are Japanese who earn and spend much less than the skilled worker and also rich Japanese who spend much more than 1,500 yen. Let us [155] assume that 1,500 yen is the average annual amount spent by a Japanese family in Taiwan and that in each family only one person is working (1). On these assumptions the disbursements of the Japanese popula-

1. It is interesting to note that the budget investigation conducted by the government-general in 1937-1938 based on 355 'representative' Japanese families comprising 1,397 persons arrived at an average of 184.56 yen per month or 2,215 yen per year. This investigation does not include the richest families but does include poorer groups (18 families with incomes below 840 yen a year) showing that our estimate of 1,500 yen is certainly not above the average, but quite probably below it. The same source gives budget figures for the Chinese on the island, but they cannot be used for purposes of accurate comparison because they embrace only the

4:Grajdanzev--154-155 S-4 (no date) 1942 Formosans-2
116, 171, 465, 511, 556, 563, 177.43, Japan
636.43

tion in 1938 are estimated at about 90 million yen. Of course, a part of this outlay would be made if Chinese workers and officials, working as hard and as well as the Japanese (2), were substituted for the latter. The average Chinese worker does not earn more than 380 yen a year (3), and a Chinese official earns about 600 yen. Thus the same number of the Chinese would cost only about 36 million yen, or about 54 million yen less than the Japanese. We shall see that this is not the chief item in the list of benefits

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higher brackets of wage earners and salaried men. Their average earnings are 137.33 yen per month, though the official average daily wage is 1.27 yen, but those receiving less than 40 yen per month comprise only one percent of the cases investigated.

2. An official source says of the Chinese in the service of the Post Office that they 'have shown themselves as satisfactory postal employees as the Japanese in the same capacity.' (*Taiwan, its System of Communications and Transportation.* p. 24.)

3. Based on the official daily average of 1.27 yen multiplied by 300 (days).

4:Grajdanzev--154-155 S-4 (no date) 1942 Formosans-3
116, 171, 465, 511, 556, 563, 177.43 Japan
636.43

which Japan derives from possession of the island (4).

4. The budget investigation conducted in Japan in 1936-37 gives the average monthly income as 90.59 yen per family for 558 families, while that in Taiwan in 1937-38 gives an average 184.56 yen for 355 families. If the groups included are reasonably comparable, as seems probable, the difference between the average earnings of the two groups gives some indication of the net advantage of the Japanese occupied in Taiwan and their 'dividend' in the colonial profits."

4:Grajdanzev--155-156 S-4 (no date) 1942 Formosans
116, 167, 457, 484, 563, 871, 177.43 Japan
636.43

"One must, however, consider the invisible items in the balance of payments. The Chinese of the island rarely emigrate from Taiwan; as we have [156] already seen, the number of islanders living abroad is negligible. There are about 1,300-1,500 Taiwanese students in Japan proper, but their support by their parents and relatives can hardly cost more than one million yen a year——a small quantity in comparison with the figures involved. The islanders do not travel abroad, they have no investments abroad from which they draw income and there are only a few foreigners on the island, so that the general picture of an island having economic connections exclusively with Japan remains undisturbed."

4:Grajdanzev--156 S-4 (no date) 1942 Formosans
116, 453, 457, 563

"We have statistics of domestic and foreign postal money orders for Taiwan. Without exception each year the amount of money orders issued in Taiwan is above the amount of money orders paid in Taiwan. The difference indicates approximately the net remittance by the Japanese in the case of domestic money orders (an order on Japan is regarded as a domestic order in Taiwan), and by the Chinese in the case of foreign money orders. The average amounts for the last 5 years (1933/34-1937/38) are as follows:

	Issued	Paid	Balance
Domestic money orders (1,000 yen)	32,207	19,880	—12,327
Foreign money orders (1,000 yen)	467	96	— 371

Source—Financial and Economic Annual of Japan, 1938.

For the last 5 years the average balance of postal money orders in favor of Japan was 12,327,000 yen while that to the advantage, presumably, of China (1) was only 371,000 yen. There is nothing astonishing in this because the Chinese working in Taiwan who are the citizens of China are either workers or petty traders and, of course, none of them are employed in governmental service. These are statistics of postal money orders, not of bank remittances, but there is no reason to suppose that the situation with respect to the latter is different."

1. We say 'presumably of China' because it is difficult to find any other foreign country to which an average of 16,000 remittances are made annually from Taiwan.

4:Grajdanzev--158 S-4 (no date) 1942 Formosans
116, 457, 563, 661, 177.43 Japan
636.43

"Of course, some part of the [trade--analyst] balance is made up by the remittances of the Japanese on the island to Japan-proper, remittances which may be presented as 'earned income' and not an income from investment. However, the thousands of Chinese citizens who reside on the island remit home to China only paltry sums. They are unable to earn as much as the Japanese, mainly because the privileged position of the Japanese is the result of the colonial status of the island. The services performed now by the Japanese in most cases could be as well performed by the islanders, but their part is to be servants of the ruling nation. It should be clear than that this 'earned income' can be considered as a special form of the general income from the colonial exploitation of the island."

4:Grajdanzev--160-161 S-4 (no date) 1942 Formosans
116, 563, 646, 177.64 Japan
636.64

" 'For the consulting of the people's opinions' there is an advisory body to the governor-general, Hyogikai (1), established in June 1921. Only government-general officials, civil and military, and those private persons 'rich in knowledge and [161] experience' whom the governor-general choses to appoint have a right to represent the people's opinions; but all high officials, civil or military, are Japanese, and, as was mentioned, they are appointed as well as dismissed at the representation of the governor-general. This advisory body, consisting of a chairman, vice-chairman, and forty members is thus made up of persons whom the governor-general finds it convenient to appoint. The chairman is the governor-general himself, and the vice-chairman is his secretary-general. Each member is appointed for a two-years period, but with the permission of the governor-general maybe released from duty before the expiry of that period. Clearly, this is a purely bureaucratic institution."

1. Usually translated 'council.'

4: Grajdanzev--162 S-4 (no date) 1942 Formosans
116, 563, 642, 177.64 Japan
636.64

"The officials of the Japanese Empire are divided into three groups--chokunin, appointed by the Emperor, sonin, highest officials, appointed with the Emperor's approva and hannin, lower officials, for whom the sanction of the Emperor is not necessary. In the government-general there were in 1938 7 chokunin officials, 119 of sonin rank, and 648 of hannin rank, while in the provinces and districts five persons were of chokunin rank, 94 of sonin and 1,523 of hannin.

These numerous high officials are exclusively Japanese and in the counties and municipalities there are hundreds more. Lower positions are occupied not only by Japanese, but also by Chinese, but as it is pointed out in Sekai nenkan, 'from the political point of view all administrative organisations are almost exclusively (hotondo zembunga) staffed with Japanese, while from the economic point of view everything is under the domination of the Japanese economy' (1).

1. P. 179."

4:Grajdanzev--163-164 S-4 (no date) 1942 Formosans-1-2
116, 563, 625, 177.62 Japan
636.62

"Besides having this regular police force the whole country is organized for police purposes through the revival of the old Chinese system of paochia. As we saw, the Chinese of the island have no voice in the government of the island, but they [164] are widely used for police purposes through the paochia system, which is obligatory for the Chinese, but from which the Japanese are free. Ten Chinese families form a chia and ten chia a pao, so that a pao comprises one hundred families or about 500-600 persons. At the end of 1938 there were 53,876 heads of chia and 5,648 heads of paochia (called paocheng in Chinese or hosei in Japanese). All these persons are elected by the members of the chia or pao, but they must be approved by the governor (or the chief of the district). It should be noted, however, that although they have no right to elect their own representatives for the self-government, the members of the pao and chia have the right to elect their own policemen. This paradox is due to the fact that the duties of the chiachang (the head of the chia) and the paocheng are heavy, unpleasant, sometimes dangerous, and completely unpaid, while any expenditures which may be incurred are covered by a tax on the members. Only relatively prosperous men can afford to do this work and even they do it for the most part unwillingly. They police their community under the guidance of the professional policemen, report the number of residents, new arrivals and departures (very severe punishments follow failure to

4:Grajdanzev--163-164 S-4 (no date) 1942 Formosans-2
116, 563, 625, 177.62 Japan
636.62

report), organize groups to pursue 'bandits', take precautionary measures in case of epidemics, repair the roads and bridges, fight insect pests, collect the taxes, etc., etc. If a crime is committed or the chiachang neglects his duty, he is the first person to be held responsible, but he along with the whole group is also held jointly responsible. This system was established by the Japanese government at a time when in spite of all governmental efforts, the island was not pacified, and some extraordinary measures were necessary to bring peace. But now, after more than forty years have passed since its inception, the system is a sign of weakness on the part of the government; it shows its distrust of a people conquered so many years ago and a belief among the rulers that only through this system can peace and order be maintained on the island."

4:Grajdanzev--165 S-4 (no date)1942 Formosans
116, 208, 563, 658, 871, 177.87 Japan
636.87

"In the sphere of education the island has passed through two periods, one before 1919 and another since that year. Before 1919 the policy of the government with respect to the Chinese of the island was vacillating. It was ready to recognize the existence of the Chinese in the Japanese Empire as a separate entity, and was ready even to help them preserve their Chinese character. A special society was created to investigate Chinese customs and habits and these were to be taken into consideration in court practice. Later, the failure of this policy was recognized and the avowed end became the japanization of the inhabitants of the islands in order to make them loyal subjects of the Empire. The elementary school was to become the chief instrument in this japanization. While before that period the education of the Chinese was completely neglected, since then school expenditures have grown and the number of pupils has increased from year to year. But this does not mean that there is any equality between the Japanese and Chinese as regards education. A literate population is necessary for the japanization of the islanders. Knowledge of the Japanese language is indispensable for workers, policemen, for the paocheng, for clerks, for all who work for their Japanese rulers. It does not mean, that there is any intention of raising the Chinese to an equal position with the Japanese."

4:Grajdanzev--166-167 S-4 (no date) 1942 Formosans-1-2

Japan

116, 563, 872, 177.87

636.87

"The growth in the number of pupils in elementary schools may be seen from the following table:

Primary Schools in Taiwan

	1935	1936	1937	1938	1939
Number of schools	781	783	789	796	812
Number of teachers	6,255	6,659	7,239	7,888	8,718
Number of pupils, 1,000	373.9	407.6	450.0	505.5	557.1
Number of pupils as percentage of children of school age	41.5	43.8	46.7	49.8	...
Graduates, 1,000	42.3	45.7	50.3	59.0	...

Source: *Taiwan Jijo*.

From this it appears that in five years the number of pupils in primary schools increased from 373.9 thousand to 557.1 thousand. About half the Chinese children of school age (8-14) are now in primary schools. This increase is partially due to the absorption of new pupils by schools, and partially to the fact that the schools have been increasing the length of the courses they offer from four to six years. If one takes into consideration the fact that during these six years the pupils must master thousands of characters as well as a foreign language and that most of the teachers are foreigners

4:Grajdanzev--166-167 S-4 (no date) 1942 Formosans-2
116, 563, 872, 177.87 Japan
636.87

(to them). it is clear that a six-year course is not a long one. These statistics do not include the schools for Japanese children. Theoretically there is complete equality in Taiwan and there are no special schools for the Japanese, but there are schools where instruction is carried on in the Japanese language. With the permission of the governor of the province Chinese may also be admitted to such schools, even if they do not know the Japanese language, but this permission is not given willingly. Many parents among the lower groups of Chinese [167] officials want to send their child to a Japanese school so that he or she will have a thorough knowledge of the language of the rulers and a better chance to get a higher paid job. But in 1936, out of 42,576 pupils in these schools, there were only 2,975 Chinese. There is another important fact with respect to the Japanese pupils; while in 1938 only fifty per cent of the Chinese of school age were in school, 99.4 per cent of the Japanese of this age were attending school in 1936."

4:Grajdanzev--167 [2] S-4 (no date) 1942 Formosans
116, 563, 873, 177.87 Japan
636.87

"A further important test of any system of education is the number of students in secondary schools and in universities. As was mentioned, literacy is a necessity under modern conditions, even in the colonies. But to give a secondary education and especially a university education to the colonial peoples en masse is quite a different proposition. On April 1, 1939, there were 5,125 Japanese and 4,117 Chinese in the Taiwan secondary schools for boys. It will be recalled that the number of Chinese on the island is almost twenty times as great as the number of Japanese, and the proportion between the children of the two groups is even greater. In the girls' secondary schools the situation is even less favorable to the Chinese—5,312 Japanese pupils as compared with only 2,541 Chinese (1939)."

4:Grajdanzev--167 S-4 (no date) 1942 Formosans
116, 563, 875

"Whether or not the Japanese and Chinese children in their respective schools receive the same kind of education may be inferred from the following fact. In 1936 the maximum monthly salary of teachers in the schools for Japanese children was ¥82 for men and ¥70 for women and the minimum, ¥40 for men and ¥30 for women. But in the public schools (i.e. for the Chinese) the maximum salary was ¥50 and minimum ¥10, and this difference was not due chiefly to nationality, for the majority of teachers in the public schools are also Japanese, but to the calibre of the teachers (1).

1. On the average the expenditure per pupil in 1936 was twice as high in schools for the Japanese as it was in schools for the Chinese."

4:Grajdanzev--167-168 S-4 (no date) 1942 Formosans
116, 563, 874

"In the specialized schools the situation is similar—[i.e. proportionally fewer Chinese than Japanese students--analyst] in the industrial schools there are 963 Japanese boys and 460 Chinese; in the commercial schools, 1,791 Japanese [168] boys and 724 Chinese. The agricultural schools form the only exception, but even here there are 588 Japanese to 1,426 Chinese pupils though there are at least 300 times as many Chinese farmers as Japanese."

4:Grajdanzev--168 S-4 (no date) 1942 Formosans
116. 563. 873

"The fact that in 1936, for example, there were 5,576 applications for entrance to secondary schools, but only 1,622 boys were admitted (29.1 per cent of the applicants) and most of those were Japanese shows that there is an ardent desire to study on the part of Taiwanese youth. In 1936 there were 985 Japanese students and 384 Chinese in the teachers' colleges (which prepare teachers for the Chinese schools)."

4:Grajdanzev--168 [2] S-4 (no date) 1942 Formosans
116, 563, 658, 873

"In discussing the public finances of Taiwan, it was noted that the expenditures on the only university in Taiwan. which is in Taihoku, cannot be considered as expenditures purely for the education of the Chinese population. In 1939 there were 192 Japanese and 90 Chinese students in this university."

4:Grajdanzev--168 [3] S-4 (no date) 1942 Formosans
116, 563, 871

"School Enrolment in Taiwan, April 1, 1939

	Japanese	Chinese
Youth of school and college age (8-22)	88,000*	2,000,000*
Pupils in primary schools	44,000*	557,135*
Pupils in secondary schools	10,437	6,658
Pupils in special secondary schools	3,343	2,610
Students in teachers' colleges (1936)	985	384
Students in the university	192	90
School Enrolment per Thousand Children of School Age		
Pupils in primary schools	500*	278*
Pupils in secondary schools	118	3.3
Pupils in special secondary schools	38	1.3
Students in teachers' colleges	11	0.2
Students in the university	2	0.05

* Approximate figures."

4:Grajdanzev--168-169 S-4 (no date) 1942 Formosans -1-2
116, 177, 563, 873

"It may be thought that the figures of students in secondary schools and colleges[see table on page 168, category 116--analyst] are not complete because they do not include those who are studying in schools and colleges in Japan proper. It is quite natural that those who have the means prefer to send their children to Japan to get their education at the centre of the Empire. We know that many Japanese from Taiwan are studying in Japan; probably their number far [169] exceeds the number of those who study in Taiwan, but unfortunately, we have no statistics. However, we have complete statistics of the Chinese from Taiwan who are students of Japanese colleges and universities. In 1936 there were in Japan 1,113 Chinese pupils from Taiwan in secondary schools of all types and 952 students in colleges and universities. These students studied: law 204 persons, medicine 507 persons, literature 27 persons, political science and economics 66 persons, commerce 71 persons, music 3 persons, art 7 persons, religion 6 persons, housekeeping 13 persons, physical culture 3 persons, all other subjects 45 persons, or a total of 952 persons.

These figures reflect the views of the students as to their future chances in life. The corresponding figures for the university in Taiwan are not so instructive because there the choice is very limited, while in Japanese they may choose in accordance with their future plans. The great majority of the students select courses leading to liberal professions—law, medicine, etc. They do this because they know that all other roads in

4:Grajdanzev--168-169 S-4 (no date) 1942 Formosans-2
116, 177, 563, 873

Taiwan are closed to them. These figures show also that the inclusion of those who study in Japan in the number of pupils and students in Taiwan does not materially change the picture."

4:Grajdanzev--169-170 S-4 (no date) 1942 Formosans
116. 171. 217. 346. 563

"Let us now consider briefly other cultural institutions in Taiwan. Below we give the data on libraries in Japan and in Taiwan.

Libraries in Japan and in Taiwan, 1936

	Japan	Taiwan
Number of Libraries	4,730	86
Books	12,647,973	369,961
Readers	24,124,344	886,084
Readers per year per capita of population	0.34	0.16

Source: Dainippon teikoku nenkan.

The libraries in Japan are not visited very often—on the average only one out of three persons visits a library once a year—but in Taiwan only one out of six persons finds his way to a library once during the year. There is nothing astonishing [170] in this when we recall that there are only eighty-six libraries for a country with a population of six millions; it means that only the cities, where the Japanese are concentrated, are supplied with them."

4:Grajdanzev--170 [21 S-4 (no date) 1942 Formosans-1-2
116, 204, 563, 656, 177.20 Japan
636.20

"Now let us turn to another important sphere of cultural activities—newspapers. In Taiwan no newspaper can be published without the permission of the government-general, and the government-general has established a 'custom' of permitting only one newspaper to a city, so that up to 1932 there were only four newspapers in Taiwan, all in the Japanese language, though they sometimes carried a column in Chinese (1). Five million Chinese in Taiwan had no newspaper of their own. In 1932 permission was granted to a Chinese weekly to appear as a daily, so that for the first time since the Japanese conquest the Chinese could read their own newspaper—Taiwan Shin-minpao. However, this experiment was short-lived. In 1937 it was decided that the people now know the Japanese language so well that no obstacles should exist to the japanization of the islanders. On March 1, 1937, all Japanese newspapers and the Chinese one carried a notice to the effect that after April 1 (for the Chinese newspaper, after June 1,) they were to cease publication of columns in Chinese (2).

1. In 1937 a fifth one was permitted for Takao.

2. Information on the newspapers is taken from Nippon shimbun nenkan, 1939. pp. 143-145. It is confirmed also by Sekai nenkan, 1929.

4:Grajdanzev--170 [21 S-4 (no date) 1942 Formosans-2
116. 204. 563. 656, 177.20 Japan
636.20

Thus after 1937 five and one half million Chinese could not read a newspaper in their own language, though most of them do not know Japanese."

4:Grajdanzev--171-172 S-4 (no date) 1942 Formosans-1-2
116, 452, 476, 563, 661, 177.47 Japan
636.47

"The growth of Taiwan's cooperative societies of all kinds is good testimony to the ability of the Chinese population to organize and to manage quite successful enterprises. The growth of the cooperative movement in Taiwan may be seen from the following table:

The Cooperative Movement in Taiwan

	1913	1918	1930	1935	
Number of societies of all types	18	171	407	462	
Number of members	2,760	70,428	265,248	342,122	
Paid-up capital 1,000 yen	484	4,455	13,949	15,250	[172]

In 1936 the urban credit cooperatives had deposits of 20.7 million yen, while the rural cooperatives had 64.3 million yen. In May, 1940 the corresponding sums were 36.4 million yen and 122.7 million yen. All this is the more remarkable because the cooperatives were developed by the Chinese with little help from the Japanese or from the cooperative associations of Japan (1), and because the government put so many obstacles

1. This does not mean, of course, that the Japanese cooperative associations were unfriendly to the Taiwan cooperative movement. Quite the contrary. Throughout the history of the Taiwan cooperative movement the Chinese received every encouragement from the Japanese societies and from the certain Japanese individuals; but this help could not be great because of the conditions existing on the island. It is

4:Grajdanzev--171-172 S-4 (no date) 1942 Formosans-2
116, 452, 476, 563, 661, 177.47 Japan
636.47

> important to emphasize that many individual Japanese physicians struggling with epidemics, teachers bringing education to far-away villages, political organizers helping the Chinese to organize their fight for freedom, and many others whose services to the Chinese were great and whose relation to the conquered people was that of sympathy and often of self-sacrifice, deserve the highest praise. However, it is not the individuals who count most, but the system, and however good the intentions of particular individuals might be, they could not and cannot change the governmental system existing on the island.

in the way of the development. The managerial and controlling staffs of the cooperatives in Taiwan must be approved by the government-general, so that 'undesirable' elements can be eliminated from the movement. The active members of the societies were often arrested and imprisoned and obstacles were put in the way of the creation of a powerful central body for the cooperative movement. But in spite of all obstacles the population of the island succeeded in building up a strong and useful organization."

4:Grajdanzev--172-173 S-4 (no date) 1942 Formosans
116, 452, 241, 476, 563, 177.47 Japan
636.47

"Since the start of the present war, however, through increasing supervision and various regulations, the government has turned the cooperatives into a piece of bureaucratic machinery, rather like the paochia. The chief function of the agricultural cooperatives, which form the backbone of the movement, has become the collection of rice and other products and their transfer to the government. According to the declared rations (1), the farmers in Taihoku province, for example, are to have only from two to

1. The ration figures are taken from the Ekonomisuto, Tokyo July 1, 1940.

two and half go of rice per day (0.6-0.75 lb.). But this is considerably below the usual consumption of [173] the farming population, so the farmers will not willingly surrender their 'surplus' and the cooperatives have been turned into organs for the compulsory collection of grain and other agricultural products. The only organization created by the islanders which had some semblance of independent existence is thus becoming a mere cog in the Japanese military machine."

4:Grajdanzev--176-177 S-4 (no date) 1942 Formosans -1-2
116, 175, 208, 563, 668, 177.65 Japan
636.65

"Political Movements (1)

1. The information concerning these movements is taken chiefly from Yanaihara, op. cit., and from Sekai nenkan, 1939.

As was shown in the historical section of this book, the island was not actually acquired by the treaty of Shimonoseki, but was conquered by the Japanese. This conquest took seven years and the Japanese recognize that the island was pacified only about 1902. However, in 1907 the Peipu rebellion broke out, the immediate cause being an attempt on the part of the officials to use the paochia in the subjugation of the savages. In 1912 the Linchi rebellion broke out in connection with the felling of the bamboo forest by Mitsui interests, and in 1915 [177] there was a new rebellion at Hsilaian. All these rebellions were suppressed by the government. These and other spontaneous movements, the information concerning which was withheld by the government, are classified by the Japanese as rebellions of the old type, to distinguish them from newer movements guided by persons with modern education and ideas. The first of these movements was led by a Japanese, Taisuke Itagaki, who came to Taiwan in November 1914 and organized Dokakai, the Assimilation Society. The purpose of Itagaki was not a revolutionary one; he wanted to see the Chinese of the island assimilated by the Japanese. He realized however, that this assimilation could not take place unless the Chinese of the island

4:Grajdanzev--176-177 S-4 (no date) 1942 Formosans-2
116, 175, 208, 563, 668, 177.65 Japan
636.65

were given equal treatment and equal opportunities in education. But such ideas appeared too dangerous to the government-general and the movement was suppressed in February 1915. Another stimulus to the awakening of political consciousness in the Chinese was given by Lin Hsien-t'ang, a wealthy Chinese who petitioned the government to permit him to open a private middle school in Taichu for the Chinese. The idea was evidently so strange and radical to the Japanese that they consider this application an important stage in the political development of the island. In 1918 the Chinese from Taiwan who studied in Tokyo organized the Domeikai, an organization the primary purpose of which was to effect the abolition of some especially harsh laws in Taiwan. In 1919 this organization started a monthly publication Taiwan Youth, which a few years later was changed into a weekly. At that time the attempt to transfer its publication to Taiwan failed, but the organ became the spearhead of the educational movement and in the 'liberal' years of 1927-30 this publication succeeded in moving to Taiwan and turned into a daily newspaper, the fate of which has already been described."

4:Grajdanzev--191 [2] S-4 (no date) 1942
116, 162, 563, 668, 656, 723, 177.66
636.66

Formosans
Japan

"It was shown in the first chapters of this book that the Japanese on the island form only a very small part of the population of the island. The mass of the population is formed by the Chinese who came to the island from Fukien and Kwangtung. In spite of the Japanese government during the past decades they have remained Chinese in their thought, in their language, religious beliefs, customs, dress. The importance of Taiwan as a base for Japanese aggression is in this respect anomalous. An island where there are more than five million potential (and in some cases actual and active) enemies cannot be considered as a perfect base. Just across the straits lies China, unconquered in spite of four years of war. Underground organizations of Chinese exist on the island, and their representatives in Chungking claim many achievements, including acts of sabotage, open fighting with the Japanese troops by Taiwan guerillas and so on. There is no way to check these claims, because the [Japanese--analyst] Government-General a long time ago turned Taiwan into a news-proof prison, from which no information is available, except that which the Government-General pleases to publish for the benefit of credulous foreigners."

4:Grajdanzev--191-193 S-4 (no date) 1942 Formosans-1-3
116, 553, 563, 723, 177.65 Japan
636.65

"In any case. the Japanese government understands the abnormality of the situation [i.e. the unexpressed and expressed hostility of the people of Taiwan toward the Japanese--analyst] and the dangers connected with [192] it. To this 'domestic' consideration a special consideration of grand strategy is added. The militarists of Japan realize that the successful management of the Eastern Asia Co-prosperity sphere cannot be realized without the goodwill of at least some groups of the local population. They plan to retain the semifeudal organization of the Dutch Indies, Thailand, Malaya, etc., but to supplement it on the one hand with direct control over rajahs, sultans, chiefs and so on, on the other hand with an indirect control through the Chinese. In each country of Southeastern Asia there are millions of Chinese, chiefly of Kwangtung and Fukien origin. Their numbers could be easily increased, because through administrative measures their immigration has been kept down. In some countries only a very small number were admitted annually; in other permits to immigrate were given more or less freely, but on condition of payment of a very high head tax. The Japanese can easily double or treble the number of immigrants, putting as the only condition of migration a guarantee of the 'political reliability' of the emigrant. The Chinese have played an extremely important part in the economic life of the countries of Southeastern Asia. This part would be greatly increased on the one hand through repeal of certain limitations upon the activities of the Chinese, on the other hand through the systematic financial assistance given by the Japanese banks to the Chinese businessman, especially to middlemen. Of

4:Grajdanzev--191-193 S-4 (no date) 1942 Formosans-2
116, 553, 563, 723, 177.65 Japan
636.65

course, the activities of the Chinese would be controlled by the Japanese, and here the Chinese from Taiwan come into the picture. Many of them beside their own native language speak Japanese also. The number of such persons can be easily increased, especially if the youth of Taiwan knows that lucrative positions will be opened for them. Thus, two lines of control can be used: on the political side—local population—rajahs—the Japanese commissioners—Tokyo; on the economic side—local population—Chinese middlemen controlled by the Taiwanese or with the help of the Taiwanese—the Japanese monopolistic concerns. The local population will be then thoroughly con-[193]trolled by the Japanese; on the other hand it will be racially divided and unable to present a united front against its masters. The Chinese will know that their interests and privileges depend upon the favor of the Japanese, their economic interests will oppose the interests of the local population. The Japanese militarists hope in this way to reconcile the native population of the island to alien rule. They declare that the greatest immediate problem in respect to the Chinese population of the island is *kominka* or turning them into imperial people, or more simply, some kind of assimilation. A campaign for the spread of the Japanese language is being conducted; the Chinese are encouraged to change their names into Japanese; various patriotic and chauvinistic societies have been established in order to influence the mind of the Chinese youth. One should not conclude from these facts that the Japanese want to establish a racial equality in this

4:Grajdanzev--191-193 S-4 (no date) 1942 Formosans-3
116, 553, 563, 723, 177.65 Japan
636.65

'co-prosperity' sphere. The Japanese authorities complain that very few islanders change their names. Actually only a few hundred have used this privilege. However, this change of name is not so simple: each case has to be approved by the governor, and it is clear that approval is given only to those who can prove their complete fidelity to their masters."

6: Kirchhoff--31 U-4 (no date) 1895 Formosans
116, 144, 162, 563

Already, there can be no doubt, the Chinese constitute the larger part of the population, for since the 17th century ever new droves have immigrated from Fu-kien and Kung-tung, and these have greatly increased, owing to the early marriages and the large numbers of children. The vigorous and enterprising tribe of the Hakka, from the latter province, has preserved its individuality on Formosan soil; its members are distinguished by their fine ironwork, and provide the natives with their knife blades and long flints. In North Formosa the Chinese settlers' wide open, sparkling black eyes attract attention, in contrast with the narrow slit eyes of the Chinese which are here quite general, otherwise; this is the result of unions of Chinese immigrants with native Malay women.

An important third element must still be mentioned. This is the Pepo-huan (also called Sek-huan or Schek-huan, i. e. "half savages"). The Pepo-huan are those Formosan Malays who accepted the fate of dependence on the Chinese intruders and gradually became Chinese in customs and outlook, without there being any mixture of blood. Yet they are distinguished physically as well as culturally from free natives living in the mountains (probably as the least numerous of the three elements making up the population of Formosa), the Tsche-huan or Tschin-huan, i. e. "complete savages," as they are called by the Chinese, who greatly fear their passion for hunting Chinese heads.

6: Kirchhoff--33 [4] U-4 (no date) 1895 Formosans
116, 314, 563

Camphor is obtained in a curious way. It is the result of a never ceasing guerrilla warfare on the forest border, where the region inhabited by the Tsche-huan begins. Risking his head in the process, the Chinese frontiersman either sets out at random with his axe into the woods or he deceives the unsuspecting savage, after having intoxicated him with Sam-schu, by swindling out of him a certificate or authorization to fell wood in his district. The greater part of the camphor tree is then used as a building wood and the rest is hacked up into chips, from which commercial camphor is obtained by moist distillation.

6: Kirchhoff--37 [4] U-4 (no date) 1895 Formosans
116, 175, 563

So, at this time, the coasts of Formosa are practically in Chinese hands. About 2/3 of the whole island has become subject to China, and the fate of the native Tschehuan [MC: savage] appears to be sealed. Either their freedom disappears, for with their unceasing feuds, they are unable to protect it or like the proud camphor trees of their native woods they themselves fall beneath the murderous blows of the Chinese, who press them ever closer.

9: Yamasaki--225 [6] N-5 (1896-1897) 1900 Formosans
116, 162, 361, 563

The Capsiulan plain is naturally not so heavily populated as the western plain, yet on its fields and meadows the more cultivated Amis, a branch of the Malayan race, enjoy an unclouded existence.

15: U.S. Navy --21 (no date) 1944 Formosans
116, 177, 563

"In pursuing the assimilation program which they have announced to be one of the two basic policies of government, the Japanese have not been notably successful. They have carried out a negative program, destroying non-Japanese institutions and customs, making an active attack upon local practices which have no political significance. The result has been the arousing of antagonism which is neutralized, to some extent only, by the obvious and manifest economic benefits which the Japanese have brought to the rural peasant class. There is a feeling of mutual suspicion and distrust among the three ethnic groups, Japanese, Formosan-Chinese and aborigines. The Japanese minority is, of course, the ruling class, socially and politically, and treats the Formosan-Chinese with open discrimination and ill-disguised contempt. Few of the natives have wealth, but all of them live in much greater general security of life and property than they did under Chinese administration. This the educated Formosan will admit. Recently the Japanese have begun to publish formal programs regarding the assimilation of the subject people."

15: U.S. Navy--21 [2] (no date) 1944 Formosans
116, 167, 563

"Two to three hundred Japanese live in each of the scattered small towns having district offices. A few, who are classed as farmers, live on the sugar plantations. A few cultivate rice as ordinary country people. They have emigrated under Government sponsorship and settled at designated places. Three East Coast villages, Yoshino, Toyoda, and Hoshina, have a total population of 3,136 Japanese. Near Taito (on the east coast) 473 individuals (79 households) have been settled. Fifty-six households (256 individuals) have been settled at Shasen-sho in Taichu Province. Twenty-five households (111 individuals) have been settled as tobacco-growers at Hinode-mura on reclaimed land along the Shimo-Tamsui River, near Heito."

15: U.S. Navy --21 [3]
116, 186, 563, 177.66
636.66

(no date) 1944

Formosans
Japanese

"The first generation of Japanese in the island came as adventurers who hoped to get rich quickly in the wake and under the protection of an occupying army. A domineering and ruthless attitude toward the native population has persisted, although the second or younger generation is beginning to identify itself with the island. It has been bred away from a strong homeland (Japan Proper) tradition. Although the essence of home and school training is emphasis on 'true Japanese spirit,' in practice the lives of these young Japanese are governed by the colonial situation in which they find themselves. They have a strongly developed 'exploitation' and imperialist outlook which prevents them from learning anything of the language or customs of the people among whom they live. Very few Japanese can speak elementary Formosan-Chinese."

15: U.S. Navy --21 [4] (no date) 1944 Formosans
116, 177, 867, 563

"Social life among the younger generation of Japanese of both sexes is more liberal than in the homeland and their outlook less traditional. Improved educational opportunities, local temples, cemeteries and other social institutions now tend to lessen the attraction of the homeland for the middle-aged."

15: U.S. Navy --21 [6] (no date) 1944 Formosans
116, 548, 563

"Japanese men very rarely legalize relations with Formosan women. So great is the antipathy toward intercourse with Formosans that the Japanese preferred to import girls from Japan Proper and Korea for the licensed quarters and cafes and dancehalls which once flourished."

15: U.S. Navy--21 [7] (no date) 1944 Formosans
116, 563, 565

"There is a noticeable social line drawn between the commercial Japanese community and the higher ranks of administrative officials and educators. Social distinction between Japanese and Formosans has no sanction in law but in practice there is a minimum of social intercourse."

15: U.S. Navy--21 [8] (no date) 1944 Formosans
116, 361, 563

"At Taihoku, where almost one-half of the entire Japanese population of the island have their homes, there is a distinct difference in the residential areas. The Formosans live north, west and southwest of the old administrative city area. The higher Japanese officialdom lives within the administrative center, together with the Japanese tradesmen whose retail shops are on the principal commercial streets. A distinctly Japanese housing development is spreading to the east of the administrative center. In other cities there is the same tendency toward voluntary segregation, but to a less marked degree. Although the Government maintains various relief agencies for the poorer people, there is little evidence of individual good feeling between classes. While generous among their own large families, both the Formosans and the Japanese are conservative in extending charity through impersonal channels."

15: U.S. Navy --21 [9]   (no date) 1944   Formosans
116, 563, 177.18   Japanese
636.18

"Many Japanese are sincere in their effort to raise Formosan-Chinese living standards and honest in their desire to have the island become a real part of the Empire in spirit as well as in political name and military bondage. Hundreds of Japanese doctors, teachers, and minor officials have devoted their lives to the welfare of Taiwan. Unfortunately they have been a minority and have had little influence on the makers of over-all policy."

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15: U.S. Navy --21-22 (no date) 1944 Formosans
116, 177, 304, 563

"The Formosan-Chinese are divided into three main groups, the Hakka Chinese, the Cantonese Chinese, and the Fukien Chinese. In addition to differences in dialect between the three divisions, there are differences in costume and folkways. The Hakka women, for instance, have never bound their feet, and are notable for the [22] work they do in the fields and woods with the men. The Fukien women, on the other hand, formerly submitted to foot-binding, which the Japanese have forbidden. It is now rare to observe any woman under forty years of age so crippled. Many who have had bound feet now attempt to treat the foot normally. The Fukien women have never worked in the fields regularly, although they assist with the harvest and in other special circumstances. In the cities both men and women of the lowest economic classes do exceedingly heavy work."

15: U.S. Navy--22 [8] (no date) 1944 Formosans
116, 181, 175, 362, 563

"The Hakka Chinese people. The ancestors of the Hakka people came to the island from the hinterland of Fukien and Kwangtung provinces. They remain distinct from other Formosans in dialect, dress and some ways of village life. They were an audacious and bellicose people when they arrived, and in the southern part of the island particularly they had to push through earlier Chinese settlements along the coast to the marginal land beyond, between the settled Chinese and the aborigines who were gradually and forcefully being dispossessed. As a consequence, even today the Hakka settlements are among the foothills rather than on the plains. This sequence of immigration has caused the Hakka to intermarry more freely with the aborigines."

15: U.S. Navy--22 [4]
116, 198, 484, 563, 177.19
636.19

(no date) 1944

Formosans
Japanese

"By making use of the Japanese language necessary in business, education and communication, the administrators of the island have created the foundation of a unity unknown in pre-occupation days. The ease of travel throughout the island is tending to blur rapidly the lines of cultural differences among the educated Formosans. All three Chinese groups are represented among the settlements along the east coast, to which many have been encouraged to move by Japanese interests."

15: U.S. Navy--22 [9] (no date) 1944 Formosans
116, 186, 668, 563, 177.66 Japanese
636.66

"It is evident from an analysis of election returns that the greatest interest in politics and representative government is shown in the districts where the Hakka people are predominant, notably in Shinchiku Province. It is also notable that many of the leaders of fierce resistance to the initial Japanese invasion of the island were Hakka people or people from areas in which the Hakka predominate. Not only is government-processed opium said to be more easily accessible in Shinchiku Province, but it is in this district that the Japanese have taken greatest pains to destroy local religious cults, and to press the Japanization program."

15: U.S. Navy --23 (no date) 1944 Formosans
116, 162, 609, 563, 484

"The Cantonese. The people of Cantonese origin have always remained rather distinct and have been considered as foreigners. They numbered 'about 100,000' in 1930. As a group they have become identified with small-scale banking and wholesale trading. They have maintained their contacts with the mainland, and, when travel was possible, many spent part of each year at Canton."

15: U.S. Navy --23 [6] (no date) 1944 Formosans
116, 563, 582, 609 Japanese
636.58

"Fusion of ethnic groups. Special permission must be obtained from the government before a marriage between a Formosan-Chinese and a Japanese can be made legal. There are a few notable cases of marriages arranged between wealthy Formosan men and Japanese women, (as between a son of the wealthy Ko family in Taihoku, for instance, and the daughter of an impecunious Japanese nobleman). As a general rule the antipathy which one race holds for the other inhibits even casual sexual intercourse between the two. This, plus the fact that the Formosan-Chinese birth rate is much higher than that of the Japanese, precludes any hope for gradual fusion of the two peoples on the island."

15: U.S. Navy -- 27 [6] (no date) 1944 Formosans
116, 454, 511, 556, 563

"As an indication of the relative wealth of individuals in Taiwan, it is notable that bank and postal savings deposits of Japanese in Taiwan are from seven to ten times larger than the average deposits of Formosans. It will be noted in the following table that per capita wealth increased rapidly until the outbreak of war between Japan and China in 1937.

Table 22: Average Savings per Depositor in Post Office Accounts

	1921	1929	1934
Japanese	¥33.3 ($15.98)	¥51.0 ($23.96)	¥146.5 ($44.27)
Formosan	¥8.2 ($3.93)	¥16.6 ($7.63)	¥14.2 ($4.29)"

15: U.S. Navy --27 [7] (no date) 1944 Formosans -1
116, 465, 511, 435, 556, 563

"Living conditions and the cost of living are intimately connected with the wage scale. Wages in Japan are two to three times higher than the wages of Formosans. For the skilled Formosan the average daily wage in the second half of 1938 was ¥1.13 ($.27) per day, and for the unskilled worker ¥.85 ($.17): figures based upon averages for sixty different categories. The Japanese official averages published for 1939 were ¥1.27 ($.33) for the Formosan-Chinese and ¥2.41 ($.625) for the Japanese laborer. The average Formosan family consists of five persons, who must depend upon these wages. As an indication of the cost of living and the standard possible, there is presented the retail prices of some commodities in Taihoku, in May, 1939, when the yen was worth $.2596:

Table 23: Retail Commodity Prices, Taihoku, 1939

Sweet potatoes	per kin (1.3228 lbs.)	6.4 sen
Rice (first grade)	" " "	11.0 "
Sugar	" " "	29.0 "
Pork (av. quality)	" " "	43.0 "
Fish	" " "	18-22.0 "
Chicken eggs, each		6.0 "
Soap per piece		10-17.0 "
Matches, per box		1.4 "
Firewood (per 100 kin)		180.0 "

15: U.S. Navy --27 [7] (no date) 1944 Formosans -2
116, 465, 511, 435, 556, 563

Table 23: (cont.)

Miso (bean paste) (100 momme: 0.827 lbs.)	8. 0 sen
Muslin, per yard	134. 0 " "

15: U.S. Navy--31 (no date) 1944 Formosans
116, 511, 177, 563, 342

"The Japanese have the highest average living standards. Insofar as their mode of living is concerned there is little to distinguish the Japanese here from the Japanese in the homeland, except that the wage scale of the former is higher. Without modification the Japanese retain their native style of architecture, which is admirably suited to a sub-tropical climate. A platform is raised about two feet over the ground. On it a layer of thick straw mats is laid. A tile roof is erected over this and the space between roof and floor enclosed by light planking and sliding panels of glass panes or paper."

15: U.S. Navy--31 [2] (no date) 1944 Formosans
116, 563, 262, 463, 457

"The Japanese diet is simple. Rice is the staple with a garnish of pickle or fish and bean paste soup. Most Japanese are managers of large enterprises, government officials or wholesale businessmen, settled in and around the large cities. They have created a large number of hotspring and recreational resorts. There are few Japanese of great wealth with permanently established residences in Taiwan, for the work of the majority is the creation and transfer of wealth from Taiwan to absentee proprietors in Japan Proper."

15: U.S. Navy--31 [6] (no date) 1944 Formosans
116, 563, 464

"In 1936 there were 81,589 workers employed in industrial enterprises having more than six workers or having a prime-mover. Of these 76,251 (93.5 percent) were Formosan-Chinese. The others were a few aborigines, a few Chinese nationals and Japanese overseers."

15: U.S. Navy--32 [8] (no date) 1944 Formosans
116, 465, 511, 563

"The Formosan-Chinese can work at a lower wage-scale than the Japanese, but at the same time are supposed to be less efficient."

15: U.S. Navy--33 [4]　(no date) 1944　Formosans
116, ~~563,~~ 463, 465, 177.46　Japanese
636.46

"Formosan-Chinese furnish almost all labor. Japanese are generally employed as foremen or skilled labor, or in particularly vital operations. For instance, they provide the personnel on the moving stock of the Government Railway system. This accounts for the difference in wage scales whereby the Japanese laborer receives from 80 to 150 percent more than Formosan-Chinese who do the same work. A Japanese tailor, for instance, at one time received two yen a day as against 1.20 yen per day for a Formosan-Chinese; a worker in a pineapple cannery 1.50 as against the Formosan-Chinese wage of 70 sen."

20: Alvarez--250[1] (no date) 1927 Formosans-1-2
116, 162, 101, 563

"The races who share among themselves the whole of the hilly parts and plains of Formosa are three in number:

(I) The Japanese, new-comers, intruders, yet the masters of the island to-day, number about a hundred thousand souls.

(II) The Chinese, owners of the island for more than two centuries, constitute the main part of its population. They call themselves hok-lo (2), viz., 'good' 'plain', and this name is applied also to the Chinese born and brought up in the 'Prefecturas' of Chiang-chin, Choan-chin and Anke, in southern Fokien. They number more than two

2. This name is applied by the Khe-lang to other Chinese of Formosa. It seems to take its origin from the fact that when the Hak-kas, persecuted everywhere in the Celestial Empire, arrived at the South of Fokien, they were welcomed there. Henceforth they appear under the name of 'thankfulness' that had been given to them by the inhabitants of that province. This, indeed, did not prevent at all the fact that until the arrival of the Japanese the Khe-lang and Hok-lo were living in continuous shie [sic] with each other. The Hok-lo of southern Fokien, whose dialect, with slight differences, is the same as that spoken in Formosa, call Khe-lang, viz., guests, those, to whom, in the dialect of Canton, in China, is applied the nickname Hak-kas, viz., terrible guests.

millions. They call Khe-lang their neighbours, who proceed from Canton and the 'Sub-Prefecturas' of Chiau-an and Tin-chiu, likewise situated in Fokien, where their ancestors are still living and their brothers well known under the name of Hak-kas. The terrible civil war that followed the downfall of the Ming Dynasty in China compelled most of the partisans of the Mings to leave their native soil. The Hak-kas, who had suffered most from persecutions, crossed the strait and established themselves in Formosa. At present they constitute the third part of the population of the island. They number about 800,000 souls.

(III) Finally, there are the genuine aborigines, who were masters of the island for many centuries before the Chinese and Japanese made their way from their native countries and reached Formosa. They are divided into two classes, viz., Pepo-huan and Che-huan. The former once occupied the vast plains which at present are inhabited by the Chinese invaders. Subdued by them, the tribes now called Pepo-huan in time adopted not only Chinese fashions, but also the Chinese language. Several northern branches still retain their mother-tongue, the old customs, manners and traditions. But their number is very limited to-day. They are named Che-huan, viz., 'savages' by the Chinese. They are hillmen, with their own peculiar language, and number about 121,500 souls, according to the official report of December, 1910."

31: Hofmann--612-613 N-3 (1909) 1912

116, 137, 311, 499, 563, 177. 31

636. 31

Formosans

Japanese

The pigtail which to us symbolizes Chinese traditions, in the cities exerts its rule in the literal as well as the figurative sense, it is a rule which cannot be stamped out. Chinese and Japanese are separated from each other by a difference in culture and beliefs which cannot be reconciled with each other. On the whole the Chinese element predominates and numerically they are so far superior that an amalgamation between the rulers and the subjects in the near future seems out of the question. The Japanese farmers, merchants, and small business men cannot compete with the Chinese; the Chinese are an astute people and they are moreover, better adapted to the [613] climatic conditions on this island. This is another motive for the Japanese to exploit the interior and to penetrate still further into the regions of the aborigines; here they plan to set up business enterprises on a large scale, but for this again they must use cheap Chinese labor. One of these enterprises is the construction of a railroad in the mountains so that the large forested regions in the vicinity of the Niitakayama (cf. Fig. 2, Mount Morrison) may be exploited. The forests are called the Arisan Forest; they have played an important role in Japanese politics during the last few years. The Fujita Company had acquired a concession for timber here; the government had to buy this land again from the company, which had already begun to build a railway, so that the price which had to be payed in all amounted to about two million yen, a sum which had to be granted by the Japanese Diet.

31: Hofmann--631 N-3 (1909) 1912 Formosans
116, 563, 609

Japanese industrial products do not sell well among the Chinese. Most of the Japanese on Formosa are high or low officials. While in view of the large population it might be expected that the Japanese would develop an active and extensive retail trade, the relations between the Chinese and Japanese so far have made this impossible; this may be due to the fact that the Chinese isolate themselves intentionally as well as to an inherent antagonism between the two groups and a lack of confidence on both sides.

35: Collingwood--136 D-2 (1866) 1867 Formosans
116, 563

"We found nothing remarkable in this village, [MLB: The large Chinese village of Sano on the east coast of Formosa.] which was essentially Chinese in its dirt, its pigs, and its inhabitants—closely resembling in character the other towns of Formosa; but our attention was arrested by a woman, whose handsome and European-looking features, and peculiar voice, at once marked her as non-Chinese, and shewed her to be one of the aboriginal inhabitants. How she came thus domesticated among the Chinese we could not learn, but we heard from various quarters that a system of petty warfare is kept up between the two races, and that occasionally some of the women are carried off by the opposing parties."

40: Kirk--20 [2] S-2 (no date) 1941 Formosans
116, 563, 759, 871, 177.56 Japanese

"Theoretically, Japanese and Formosans may attend the middle and high school as well as the university, but in practice the Formosans find many difficulties in their path. The more important positions in business and the professions, with one exception, seem to be held by Japanese exclusively. Medicine is the one profession open to educated Formosans on equal terms with the Japanese."

Annex "A," Subparagraph 1c,
Sociological Background

POPULATION OF FORMOSA

I. INTRODUCTION

161 The population of Formosa [Taiwan] in 1955 is estimated[1] at about 10,400,000, including about 7,500,000 Formosa-born Chinese (hereafter Formosan Chinese, as distinguished from Mainland Chinese), about 2,000,000 Chinese civilians from the Mainland, 700,000 military personnel and troops, and about 200,000 non-Chinese tribes of aborigines. The latter are composed of seven linguistically distinct tribes believed to have come originally from Malaya, the Philippines, New Guinea, and Kwangtung Province. The Formosan Chinese are descendants of Mainland Chinese who migrated from Fukien and Kwangtung provinces chiefly during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

II. ETHNIC GROUPS

162 The population of Formosa may be divided
563 into two distinct ethnic groups: the aborigines and the Chinese.

A. Aborigines

Prior to 1600, Formosa was sparsely populated by so-called aborigines, referred to by the Japanese as "savages" and by the Chinese government as "mountain tribes" or "brethren of the mountains," whose habitations ranged

[Footnote 1 next page.]

162 563 over most of the island. However, an increasing number of Chinese immigrants, with their superior civilization, pushed these natives into mountainous areas and thereafter occupied the fertile lowlands of the island.

563 105 According to language, custom, and physical characteristics, the aborigines are commonly divided into seven tribes: Taiyal, Saiset, Bunun, Ami, Paiwan, Tsou, and Yami. Although physical characteristics may vary, they are generally brave warriors and can run long distance or climb steep mountains and cross swift streams with skill and speed. Their short stature, light-brown skin, and straight black hair, as well as their language and customs, suggest a close resemblance to the Malays of the South Seas. They are independent in nature, passionate in temperament, and show respect for the aged and love for the young. They live in villages and build huts made of wood and stones. Some 70,000 aborigines are called Pepohuan, meaning assimilated savages. Their customs and activities are similar to those of the Formosan Chinese who had assimilated them in the lowlands. Tribesmen who were not able to bear the economic and cultural pressures exerted upon them fled to the mountainous interior.

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1. This estimate is the result of reconciling various estimates offered by writers on Formosa's population. The analyses in this chapter, however, will be based on the total registered population because the household registry system provides the only statistics available on the population. The total registered population in 1953 was 8,438,016.

A. The Rural Family

596 369 563 The patriarchal, extended family common to the Mainland is the pattern of the family for the majority of people on Formosa. In rural communities, the father and sons work in the fields, the mother and the wives of married sons look after the hogs, fowl, and cattle and do the work of the household. Daughters care for the younger children, help in the preparation of meals, and wash the clothes. Boys and girls attend school until twelve years' of age; schooling continues after that age only if the child is talented and the family is able to afford tuition and the loss of the child's labor at home. Generally speaking, women of Fukienese descent are not given as many laborious duties as the Hakka women, who raise hogs, cattle, and fowl, and tend vegetable plots even in non-farming communities. Fukien children are more apt to prepare for city jobs than to continue work on the farms.

Since World War II, farm rents have been reduced and farmers are encouraged to farm more intensively in order to secure larger yields. As a result, women now do more farm-work than before. It is reported that women in Chihu are responsible for at least

369 596 563 40 per cent of the district's agricultural production; in 1937, they accounted for only 17 per cent of the total yield.[1]

The aborigines in the mountainous regions of Formosa make a living from slash-and-burn agriculture and hunting. Some of the aboriginal tribes (the Bunun, the Tsou, the Paiwan, and the Yami) follow the patriarchal, extended family pattern. Others (the Atayal and Saisett) have a nuclear family organization -- each member of the family fulfills a definite role fixed by tribal custom. Aborigine women ordinarily do more farm work than Chinese women. Until recently few children from native tribes attended school, and until recently few aborigines ventured outside their tribal regions.

B. The Urban Family

369 161 The population of Formosa has been increasing rapidly. The rate of increase is greatest in the urban areas. Each of Formosa's four largest cities -- Taipei, Kaoshiung,

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[1] Arthur F. Raper, Rural Taiwan - Problem and Promise, Taipei, 1953, p. 120.

Annex "A," Subparagraph lr,
Sociological Background

ATTITUDES AND REACTIONS

I. COMPOSITION OF POPULATION

563 Ninety-eight per cent of the population of Formosa are of Chinese origin. Two per cent of the population are aborigines whose origin, although generally conceded to be Malayan, remains a subject for academic dispute. Among the Chinese, approximately eighty per cent are the descendants of early Chinese settlers, whom we call Formosan Chinese, or often simply Formosans. The early settlers came to the island from the southern part of Fukien Province and the eastern Part of Kwangtung Province between 1600 and 1895. In 1895 the island was ceded to Japan and immigration from the Mainland was restricted.

During the half century of Japanese occupation, Chinese tradition and culture were preserved by the Formosan people, the family remained the center of most social and economic activities, and Formosan Chinese, anxious to maintain a sense of solidarity, kept in touch with their relatives on the Mainland.

45:Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AD 1 Formosa

~~AD 1~~ AD1

563 In 1937, the Japanese launched a campaign to destroy the spritual affiliation of the Formosan Chinese with their ancestral land. The Japanese language was used in the classrooms, and Shintoism was introduced to replace the traditional polytheistic religion of the Formosans. But before these efforts could take effect, World War II ended and Japan was forced to relinquish its rule in Formosa.

Approximately twenty per cent of the curren Chinese population on the island immigrated to Formosa after 1945. The greatest number arrived in 1949-50 when the Communists seized control of the Mainland. Most of the recent immigrants, former government employees and commercial workers, have settled in the larger cities. Racially and culturally they resemble the Formosan Chinese, although many speak a different dialect. They regard their residence in Formosa as temporary, since most of them were forced to leave family and property on the Mainland.

The aborigines, who constitute two per cent of the population, lead a primitive life in the mountainous regions of the island. Those tribesmen who lived on the plains, have been assimilated by the Chinese and have accepted Chinese customs and preoccupations.

648 cent of them involved Mainland men and Formosan women, and 0.3 per cent involved Formosan men and Mainland women. Among the 1790 court marriages in Taipei in 1955, 1074 brides were Formosans and 714 were Mainlanders, while 1709 bridegrooms were mainlanders and only 81 were Formosans.[20] However, the majority of the civilian Mainlander population belong to the higher age group.[21] Most of them are married, but their families were broken up at the time of their exodus to Formosa. The strong attachment of the Chinese individuals to their families and their ancestral homes makes it impossible for them to forget the liberation of the Mainland, however remote such an eventuality may appear. "It was quite obvious to all but the blind and the bigoted that the Nationalists want nothing more than to be back in China and to leave Formosa as a loyal and prosperous province with a liberal degree of local autonomy."[22]

IV. ATTITUDE OF THE ABORIGINES

563 The aborigines were the victims of ruthless persecution under Japanese rule. The whole aboriginal population was placed under rigid police control. A 316-mile picket line with electrified wire fences and guard houses girdled the districts where the "savages" dwelt. Yet the Japanese failed to subjugate them. As late as 1930, 190

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[20] Pan-Asia News Alliance, Taipei, dispatch of Jan. 10, 1956.

[21] More than three times as many males as females in the 40-49 group.

[22] H. Maclear Bates, Report from Formosa, London, Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1952, p. 120.

563 Japanese lost their lives in the attempt to subdue a revolt staged by the aborigines. After 1936 the Japanese colonial government tried to assimilate the aborigines: (a) by removing them from their remote mountain homes to small plots of land on the plains where they could be more easily watched and where they might settle down as farmers; (b) by establishing schools within the aborigines' territory. A four-year primary school and some vocational courses were set up for them by the Japanese. This accounts for the fact that a small percentage[23] of the aborigines can speak the Japanese language.

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657 After the restoration of the island to China, the aborigines are no longer called "savage They are referred to as "mountain tribesmen" and addressed as "mountain brethren." The administration of the mountain areas has been transferred from the Police Department to the Civil Affairs Department of the Provincial Government. The areas are divided into 30 hsiang (groups of villages) and 192 ts'un (villages).[24] The chiefs

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[23] About 30 per cent. "In the east coast town like Hualien, the bus conductresses make their announcements in Japanese, so that even the aborigines will know where to get down." Manchester Guardian, op. cit., p. 12.

[24] T'ai-wan Ti Shan-ti Hsing-cheng [Administration of Mountain Areas], published by the Information Department of Taiwan Provincial Government, Taipei, 1952, p. 15.

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of the rural districts are all elected by the aborigines themselves. They are represented in the Provincial Assembly by three members, two elected by the tribesmen living in mountain areas and one by those living on the plains. One tribesman, Hua Ch'ing-chi, serves as a Commissioner in the Provincial Council. In the 144 elementary schools provided for the aborigines, 17,734 children and 6,032 adults were enrolled in the second semester of 1951.[25] It is said that 71.56 per cent of school age children are receiving education.[26] With the assistance of the Sino-America Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction, the Nationalist Government is also improving the livelihood and economy of the tribesmen. The number of health stations has been increased. A total of 30 health stations and 120 substations have been set up since November 1949. Efforts have been made to improve the quality of the cattle and to increase the number of hogs in the aboriginal areas A selected number of aboriginal girls are to be trained in sewing and sericulture.[27] The guarding of the mountain areas has been relaxed. In fact,

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[25] Ibid., p. 22.

[26] Chung-hua Min-kuo Nien-chien [Yearbook of the Republic of China], 1954, p.818.

[27] General Report of J.C.R.R., Vol. IV, 1954, p. 186.

563 many tribesmen are found patrolling the streets in Taipei as members of the local police force. 657 No noticeable friction has ever been reported between the aborigines and other groups. For this the Nationalist government should be given credit. The aborigines are at long last recognized as a part of the community, and some headway has been made to bring about their economic betterment. It is quite natural that they are satisfied with Nationalist rule.

642 organizations and professional associations are represented both in the National Assembly and the Legislative Yuan.[16] Political parties, if lawfully organized, are given equal status and are allowed equal opportunity to participate in elections. All organizations must be registered with the proper authorities by their sponsors. Whoever joins an association formed with the object of committing or inciting rebellion is subject to imprisonment.[17]

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53 It is definitely stipulated in the Chinese Constitution that all citizens of the Republic of China, irrespective of sex, religion, race, class, or party affiliation, shall be equal before the law. A minimum quota of seats are reserved for women delegates in all representative bodies.[18] And to insure the election of women candidates, votes cast for them are computed separately. There is no religious or racial discrimination in China. A quota of seats in the National Assembly and the Legislature is expressly reserved for "people living in the interior areas," i.e., the minority races.[19]

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[16] Law of Election and Recall of National Assembly Delegates, 1947, Article 4; and Law of Election and Recall of Legislators, 1947, Article 4.

[17] Criminal Code, 1935, Article 154, and Rebellion Act, 1950, Article 5.

[18] Constitution, Article 134.

[19] Constitution, Article 135.

this growth was due to the natural increase of the Chinese people. Density 161
of settlement increased to 376 per square mile of total land area in 1935, 241
and to 424 in 1940. This was a high density in a country where 70 per cent 177
of all gainfully occupied men were in agriculture and cultivated land was limited to the river valleys of the northern tip and the fertile areas facing China. Industry was limited largely to the processing and transportation of agricultural products until the war preparations of the Japanese induced rapid industrialization and urbanization in the middle and the late thirties.

In this economic development, Japan's main interest lay in agricultur- 463
al commodities which enabled her to be less dependent on sources outside of 563
the Empire. The Japanese occupied the major administrative, technical and 177
managerial positions while the Chinese comprised the farmers and the unskilled laborers. The latter were maintained in relative isolation from the 871
outside world with minimum possibilities for economic or cultural advancement. However, an increasing proportion of the children of the Island received elementary education and some even received a secondary education. A select few attended the Imperial University in Taiwan and went on to study in Japan. This cultural leaven was Japanese-oriented to a degree far beyond linguistic adaptation. In fact, the Japanization that had been in process of slow evolution since the initial conquest became a firm policy of forced cultural assimilation by the late thirties.

Here was a classical experiment in the potentiality of the Chinese peasant to reproduce his numbers under favorable conditions. Famines were eliminated and food available for subsistence increased in amount. Epidemics were controlled and the effects of endemic diseases were mitigated. All forces conspired to preserve and to sustain life in so far as possible with known technologies and at minimum cost. The same economic and political ideology insured the continuation of high birth rates. The familial values which had insured survival throughout the millenia in the rice lands of the Mainland were preserved in the isolated peasant villages of Taiwan.

THE DEATH RATE

The demographic paradox of colonialism appeared early in Taiwan. A com- 165
bination of forces produced a decline in the death rate without either a 563
concomitant or a delayed decline in the birth rate. Recorded death rates

165 563 declined consistently from 33 per 1,000 total population in 1906 to 1909, to 20 in 1930 to 1937, with temporary setbacks only during World War I.

Life tables for the Japanese and the Chinese as of 1926 to 1930 place in sharp focus the low economic and health position of the native peoples as contrasted to the alien elite. The expectation of life at birth for males was 38.8 for the Chinese and 48.5 for the Japanese. The excess deaths of the Chinese were concentrated among children. Deaths during the first year of life amounted to 174 for each 1,000 boy babies among the Chinese and only 85 for the Japanese. Only 73 per cent of the Chinese boy babies lived to reach age 5.

The decline in the mortality of the Taiwanese under Japanese domination was appreciable but it did not approach the attainment of the standards deemed minimal in the West. At the end of the Japanese period the expectation of life at birth was perhaps 10 years greater than it was for the people of China or of India when there were no major epidemics or famines. The allocation of a larger portion of the production of the Island to the health, educational and cultural needs of the people could have produced sharp declines in the death rate and hence an even more rapid rate of population increase. An altered distribution of income within the existing technological

Taiwanese Children

matrix could easily have reduced death rates to 12 or 15 per 1,000 total 165
population and, if birth rates had remained at 45, shot the rate of natural 563
increase from 2.5 per cent per year to 3.0 per cent or more.

THE BIRTH RATE

Neither the extension of cultivation, the increase of yields nor the 163
health and medical activities in Taiwan produced any major changes in the familial patterns of the peasants. The recorded birth rate of the Chinese remained above 40. There were some slight evidences of a lower birth rate in the more prosperous and urbanized provinces, but the social and occupational groups that might have adopted the modern individual and familial values, rather than the traditional Eastern values, were few in numbers.

The growth implicit in the maintenance of fertility at the level that existed in Taiwan during the last decade of Empire was indeed rapid. The gross reproduction rate for the entire population was over 3.2 and the net rate over 2.0.

It is obvious that no population dependent on agriculture and inhabiting a limited and already densely settled area could reproduce indefinitely at the rate implicit in these figures. Potential growth was more rapid than the actual growth of the thirties, though, for any social and economic changes that would improve levels of living and contribute ultimately toward a reduction in fertility would produce immediate and more rapid declines in the death rate.

THE PROSPECTS: PREWAR JAPANESE VIEW

The balance between the people and the land in prewar Taiwan may have 433
appeared precarious to the Western student but the Japanese foresaw many de- 241
cades of further expansion before the Malthusian pressures of the people on 439
the food supply would limit either population growth or exportable surpluses. Rice production had increased from 2.1 million koku in 1900 to 4.9 million in 1923 and 9.7 million in 1940. In the latter year the export surplus amounted to five million koku. By 1950 rice production would amount to 12.8 million koku and the quantity available for export to Japan Proper would increase by almost a million koku.

The Japanese also realized that Asian hegemony implied a destiny beyond the agrarian for the once subject peoples and that Japan's own demographic

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CHAPTER III

Economic Activities and Social Change

THE activities, interests, and aspirations of the Japanese community 178
in Taiwan were things that existed apart from the indigenous population. These elements were never effectively communicated to the Taiwanese—partly through a design to withhold them, and partly through reluctance among the people of Taiwan to accept them. Consequently the conduct of Japanese residents is not of much help in understanding the accustomed modes of life among the island's people. It is the latter problem that has the more interest for demography, and makes it essential to consider the background of social order in Taiwan and the changes under colonial rule.

The Early Agrarian Order in Taiwan

The importance of agricultural pursuits in imposing a predominantly 167
agrarian character on a society is not a thing that can be precisely 241
measured. Short of perfect exactitude, a great deal can be
learned with lesser devices, by describing the cultural setting of agriculture 511
in Taiwan, and pointing out how it influenced the participation by Taiwanese in the island's economy. The basis of this setting lay in the conditions that prevailed before Taiwan became a colony of Japan.

By the mid-19th century, the lowland region of Taiwan was rapidly becoming fully settled. Piracy, which had made Taiwan a scourge to sea traffic along the China coast, gradually subsided into sedentary agriculture. Most of the Chinese population was already supporting itself by farming and the marketing of farm products. Since 1700 immigration had brought in a steady stream of Chinese from the mainland. In spite of sporadic prohibitions, hundreds of thousands of peasant farmers came to seek refuge from rural poverty in South China. Once arrived, they often reverted to this same condition, by reaching unfavorable terms with some of their countrymen already entrenched there as land speculators.

Poverty tended to reproduce itself among those who reached Taiwan, 167
though there was also great wealth open to the few who rose
from cultivation to commerce. Each settled family held an advantage 563 •
over newcomers. This superior position placed new migrants in 423

167 some competition for the more desirable lands near the coast. In order to maintain their accustomed manner of farming, many were
• 563 forced to move inland, where they gradually dispossessed aborigines and the earlier Hakka settlers and pushed eventually to the foothills
423 of the interior. These many-sided conflicts of interest gave rise to land tenures more complicated than those usually found in China. The result was a set of property customs that was to become confused and encumbering in later years.[1]

With agrarian land tenures, however, it is all too easy to mistake form for substance. The system of land tenures in Taiwan gained several features that are distinctive to itself, arising to incorporate new parties into an old system—the aborigines who first occupied the area, and Chinese who acquired land titles to profit from the arrival of immigrants. But, since these landed property relationships are of little interest to us from an antiquarian point of view, their lasting effects are more important: they contributed to a form of village organization that survived through the entire Japanese occupation down to the present.

631 The flow of migrants is remarkable in that it populated Taiwan, with little variation over the years, closely after the model of the South China coastal area.[2] The resemblance to the mainland went beyond forms of settlement and land utilization. Politically, under Manchu control the island was supposed to be assimilated into the administration of the rest of China. It was governed as a regular political division—first as a prefecture of Fukien and later as a province itself—by officials appointed directly from Peking.

177 Taiwan inevitably presented special problems of control. In the first place, it could be separated from easy communication with the continent; eventually it grew almost as accessible to the Western powers as to Peking. The device most relied upon to tie the area to China was a weak one. The authorities tried, futilely, to isolate it from all external contact. From time to time, they went as far as to restrict the entry of Chinese from across the Straits, though even this had little success.

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[1] See Ch'en Cheng-hsiang (1950), pp. 41-43, and Kawada, Shiro (1928).

[2] The instances of alleged "radical transformation" of land tenures (Kawada, Shiro [December 1928], p. 88) were primarily fiscal measures to reassert the central government's share in revenues from the land. Such reforms often are superficial from the standpoint of village organization. By way of illustration, one of the early official acts of the Japanese in Taiwan was to sweep away a whole section of these archaic land titles. While these reforms cleared the way to regulate rural areas from outside, they scarcely made an impression on property relations within the villages.

by the annual registry of agricultural population (i.e., members of families dependent on agriculture).[26] The two major spurts in factory employment occurred during the first World War and just preceding the second. These were the only two periods of substantial slackening in gradual increments of farm population to the point of actual decline in the early 1920's. After 1940 this portion of the population resumed its usual rate of growth, suggesting that the opportunities for shifting the balance of employment had begun to disappear. 463 162

Occupational Shifts: Taiwanese and Japanese

The data up to this point illustrate some of the redeployment of manpower in the economy. They give no basis for considering the social changes that were responsible, for they do not disclose who were the participants. To understand how manpower responds to altered environmental conditions, one must know some of the affiliations that have shaped its members' decisions. Moreover, "economic development" is of no great interest here for its own sake, but rather for the nature of its reception and use by peoples not yet under its full influence. Therefore the Taiwanese are the important group to observe, and in a different sense the Japanese in their role of aliens on the scene. 463 162 563 ●

Most of the apparent diversification in economic activities shown in Table 12 did not consist of movements in the Taiwanese population at all. It reflected primarily the special characteristics of Japanese in Taiwan. Though never more than one-twentieth of the total population, their nationals were so concentrated in certain special positions that they often outnumbered Taiwanese. Once this special group is removed (Table 14), Taiwanese appear to have contributed only a small amount to the total occupational shifts up to 1930. Separated from the presence of Japanese in these key posts, the part of Taiwanese in the modernized sectors of the economy was indeed a modest one.

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[26] The total population and agricultural population have been reduced to one-hundredth of their size to fit into Fig. 10. They can consequently be used to show more than merely relative trends. Where either one intersects a trend line for factory employees, the ratio of the latter to the former is 1:100, or 1 per cent. (Of course, the scale being logarithmic, the same relation does not hold between points separated by larger intervals.) This circumstance helps to point out how small the total amount of work in factories was in relation to the entire population. At its peak, judged by these figures, it occupied less than 3 per cent of the population. It remained under 2 per cent for most of this period.

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TABLE 14

OCCUPATIONAL COMPOSITION OF TAIWANESE
Per Cents of Occupied Males Reported in Each Occupation,*
1905, 1920 and 1930

Occupation	*1905*	*1920*	*1930*
Agriculture	69.9	68.9	68.0
Fishing	2.8	2.2	2.1
Mining	0.5	1.4	1.3
Manufacturing	5.6	7.9	7.6
Commerce	7.4	7.6	10.2
Transportation, etc.	2.2	3.2	3.9
Gov't. & Prof.	1.8	2.2	2.7
Other	9.8	6.6	4.2
Total Occupied	100.0	100.0	100.0
Per Cent of Males Occupied	66.7	61.8	57.7

* Domestic servants have been excluded. Occupations are adjusted in 1905 and 1920 to be comparable with 1930.
Source: Data of Table 16.

As for the Japanese, most who were old enough to work had been born in the Home Islands. All of these had arrived in Taiwan as a result of some decision to move, and presumably had some purpose in being there. Theirs was a highly selective migration. It brought in the promoters and technicians, the industrialists and clerical personnel, the officials and minor functionaries to operate this first colonial venture. As in most colonies, they enjoyed facilities and perquisites of a superior type—better, if not to conditions generally prevailing in the home country, at least to the standards that they as individuals could have expected at home.[27]

Much of the migration was coordinated with economic policy.[28]

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[27] On top of better vocational opportunities, Japanese commonly received special bonuses for service in Taiwan. Rates of pay for comparable wage labor in Taiwan were consistently higher for Japanese (see *Statistical Summary*, Tables 301-303).

[28] This had not always been the case. For most of the first decade after 1895, Japanese were permitted to go to Taiwan with little restriction. The freedom attracted an "undesirable" element to the island, whose business activities were so unbridled and uncoordinated as to call forth a stricter government policy to deal with incoming personnel. Japanese looked back from the later ordered development on this early chaotic period with horror. The unsatisfactory results of laissez-faire may also have contributed to the decision to centralize the most profitable opportunities in state hands. Through official monopolies in the major export lines, it was possible to regulate continuously the conduct of Japanese businessmen as well as to make substantial levies in these enterprises for revenue.

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Japanese drew lessons from the colonial experience of European powers in supplying the special skills and competencies that their program required. Government and private industry recruited their personnel from Japan, according to needs which they determined in advance. In one respect they learned the lessons of staffing their technical positions better than their teachers: they paid more attention to procuring lower levels of skills from their own ranks along with filling the top functions. Important implemental positions, like police, railroad technicians, and maintenance men, were heavily staffed with Japanese.

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All Japanese nationals, regardless of whether specially recruited or not, were favored over Taiwanese when employed by Japanese concerns.[29] The best openings were in professional and official positions, as administrators in government and finance. Less coveted, but still bearing prestige over Taiwanese counterparts, were the jobs of technical and skilled workers in transportation and industry, and petty officials in the government bureaucracy. In every census Japanese appeared consistently in these occupations (see Table 15).

As a group, they were conspicuous in staying out of agriculture,

TABLE 15

OCCUPATIONAL COMPOSITION OF JAPANESE IN TAIWAN

Per Cents of Occupied Males Reported in Each Occupation,*
1905, 1920 and 1930

Occupation	*1905*	*1920*	*1930*
Agriculture	1.0	4.4	4.6
Fishing	0.6	2.0	2.1
Mining	5.0	1.9	0.5
Manufacturing	20.6	27.4	18.2
Commerce	16.5	15.0	14.6
Transportation, etc.	13.9	11.7	11.0
Gov't. & Prof.	41.3	37.2	45.6
Other	1.1	0.4	3.4
Total Occupied	100.0	100.0	100.0
Per Cent of Males Occupied	80.4	69.0	60.8

* Domestic servants have been excluded. Occupations are adjusted in 1905 and 1920 to be comparable with 1930.
Source: Data of Table 16.

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[29] Notwithstanding, the colony had its failures. The census reports list a scattering of Japanese as day laborers, ricksha pullers, longshoremen, and in similar occupations.

463 despite the fact that most were engaged in some capacity in helping
•563 the passage of farm products to Japan. Japan made almost no use of
Taiwan as an outlet for its own growing agricultural population.
162 From time to time the authorities announced projects for settling farmers from the Home Islands. These plans may have been designed to make a favorable impression among government circles in Japan itself; none ever proved feasible in Taiwan. Only a few thousand "colonists" of this type came to Taiwan and made a start in farming. In spite of manifold blessings of official support, subsidies, and special privileges, the settlements never managed to prosper. The families often left the countryside for better employment in towns and cities, and during the 1930's the whole idea was abandoned.[30]

Taiwan's economy was thus organized not only to export its narrow range of commodities to Japan, but to import its basic specialized skills in the persons of Japanese migrants. For the authorities this was an easy answer to the problem of staffing essential functions with people of appropriate training and experience. It avoided, among other things, the need to devise means for securing them from the human resources at hand in Taiwan. From the standpoint of Japan it was not an efficient solution. It drew upon types of manpower that the Japanese at home could not well afford to lose, and at the same time failed to make the best use of talents existing among the Taiwanese.[31] This anomaly in distribution of skills between the two areas is illustrated in Fig. 11. Japanese residents in Taiwan were a highly selected group even for Japan itself, where technical abilities were also scarce.

Possession of an external source of supply for specialized skills had

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[30] Yanaihara, Tadao (1929), pp. 174-175, notes that it was already a failure before 1930.

[31] The founding of Taihoku Imperial University was an outstanding example of this policy. It was an institution of high caliber, well equipped and operated by men of repute in Japan. The University notably did *not* engage in training any considerable number of technical personnel among Taiwanese. It was organized to promote research rather than teaching, its classes were small, and Taiwanese students were not readily admitted. See Kerr, George H. (1942), p. 53 ff.

On a more practical plane, several technical schools were later established for limited training of Taiwanese. These, to use the common expression of educators in this country, were "vocational" rather than "professional" in that they taught manual instead of liberal skills. Enlargement of educational facilities came too late to provide the technical training needed for the war effort, though it did serve to advance literacy (in the Japanese language) among Taiwanese youth (see *Census of 1930, Statistical Tables,* Table 81). Once started, the spread of educational facilities made considerable headway. By 1943, 70 per cent of Taiwanese children of legal school age were attending some sort of school. In time this more liberal turn of policy might have paved the way for admitting Taiwanese into more responsible positions in the island's new industrial program.

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

Fig. 11. Trends in Occupations in Taiwan and Japan, 1905-1940.

certain cogent advantages. The alien status of Japanese nationals was useful in keeping high standards of responsibility and performance among members of the public and private bureaucracies. This personnel could be interposed to administer Taiwanese affairs without becoming susceptible to local pressures. Though the Japanese had gained access to the rural society by manipulating its traditional institutions, they had to guard against subversion of their administration by influence from the Taiwanese side.

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They did not succeed, as no large organization has, in making their officials completely disinterested and honest. There were scandals and reports of self-enrichment on the part of several of their highly-placed nationals. When it came to collusion with Taiwanese, however, they were all but incorruptible. The instances of improbity that achieved publicity in Taiwan were mostly between government and business interests. Irregularities of this sort did not threaten the objectives of the regime, for these parties had more at stake together than at issue in the economic expansion. Much of what was lost in

563 this wasteful scheme of recruiting from abroad therefore must have been regained in the form of security against the conservative influence of tradition from within.

In one respect, however, this policy proved to be an unqualified loss to the Japanese. They established a caste-like status for their own nationals, hedged about with favoritism in employment, education, and business opportunity. This widened the gulf that the general severity of their rule had made between themselves and the Taiwanese. The enmity that they had earned among the population left them unprepared to bring it effectively into the last-minute industrial effort called forth by the war.[32]

We know from the Japanese themselves that the latter 1930's were for them years of exceptional new decisions and vigorous efforts at expansion. Official policy began to assert itself more strongly in matters of industrial planning and investment. The previous success in aiding farm production, which had given official circles some occasion for complacency, suddenly became inadequate. The government began at a strenuous pace to mobilize Taiwan's economy for serving the broader purposes of the Empire.

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On very short notice they sought to transform Taiwan into a quasi-industrial appendage of Japan. The attempts to encourage new aptitudes and incentives among Taiwanese are as interesting to contemplate, in terms of their implications for manpower, as were the attempts to prevent this very development. The two objectives are of course incompatible, but they were fostered side by side by the Japanese under the stress of preparing for war. Yet by 1940, at the peak of all this energy, the portion of the working population employed outside of agriculture was scarcely greater than at earlier census dates—still only one-third, and this figure includes an undetermined number of Japanese residents (see Table 11). Only a tiny fraction of the people in Taiwan had taken up factory employment, and many of these were also Japanese. We are left with the conclusion that Japanese colonial policies and indigenous tradition had combined to restrict social change within a small segment of the population. Japanese comprised most of this segment. New activities were spread thinly among Taiwanese, and left the remainder engaged in the same pursuits as their ancestors for countless generations.

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[32] During the quickened prewar mobilization of their resources in Taiwan, despite the crowded condition of agriculture, Japanese businessmen actually complained of a *shortage* of labor in industry.

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TABLE 16

Taiwan: Total Males, and Males with Occupation Distributed by Occupation, at Census Dates, 1905 to 1930. Total All Groups, Taiwanese, Japanese, and Others*

Occupation	*1930*	*1920*	*1915*	*1905*
TOTAL MALES				
Occupied	1,369,877	1,180,842	1,155,777	1,081,667
Agr. and Forestry	864,884	761,047	776,181	731,473
Fishing (Excl. Salt)	27,709	25,858	26,911	29,465
Mining	18,345	17,240	9,741	6,843
Manufacturing	122,066	112,063	94,338	67,526
Commerce	148,847	97,726	93,171	83,815
Transportation	61,323	45,645	38,901	29,138
Gov't. and Prof.	69,644	48,018	34,737	30,568
Other	57,059	73,245	81,797	102,836
TAIWANESE MALES				
Occupied	1,265,185	1,100,297	1,088,199	1,045,667
Agr. and Forestry	860,613	757,917	772,437	731,102
Fishing (Excl. Salt)	25,916	24,261	26,150	29,260
Mining	16,970	15,629	8,319	5,203
Manufacturing	95,832	87,314	72,444	58,833
Commerce	129,372	83,600	79,823	77,060
Transportation	48,677	35,428	29,505	23,186
Gov't. and Prof.	34,260	23,811	19,177	18,923
Other	53,545	72,337	80,344	102,100
JAPANESE MALES				
Occupied	75,812	63,853	53,403	27,835
Agr. and Forestry	3,474	2,815	3,430	285
Fishing (Excl. Salt)	1,617	1,310	611	170
Mining	411	1,187	1,113	1,380
Manufacturing	13,796	17,530	16,482	5,739
Commerce	11,043	9,567	9,498	4,592
Transportation	8,360	7,466	6,273	3,871
Gov't. and Prof.	34,511	23,751	15,328	11,502
Other	2,600	227	668	296
OTHER MALES				
Occupied	28,880	16,629	14,169	8,165
Agr. and Forestry	797	315	312	86
Fishing (Excl. Salt)	176	280	150	35
Mining	964	424	309	260

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

Fig. 19. Growth of Population in Major Cities of Taiwan, 1920-1940. Taiwanese and Japanese.

both places. They certainly esteemed urban more than rustic life; but work of a similar nature was also available to them outside the cities. For them the place of residence had less influence on their type of livelihood.

Ethnic Composition of Cities

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The growth of cities depended on only a small part of all Taiwanese to supply the necessary migrants. It was not so with the Japanese. In a sense, the majority of them were migrants, having been born outside of Taiwan. More important, however, nearly two-thirds of all Japanese took up residence in cities and presumably stayed there (see Table 25). They found an urban setting most advanta-

TABLE 16 (continued)

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Occupation	*1930*	*1920*	*1915*	*1905*
Manufacturing	12,438	7,209	5,410	2,954
Commerce	8,432	4,538	3,849	2,163
Transportation	4,286	2,727	3,122	2,081
Gov't. and Prof.	873	455	232	143
Other	914	681	785	443

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* For comparability, Domestic servants are excluded at all dates; Ceramics workers are assigned to Manufacturing in 1905 and 1915; Salt workers are assigned to Manufacturing from Fishing in 1905, 1915, and 1920.

Sources: *Census of 1905, General Volume*, Table 25.
Census of 1915, Statistical Tables, Table 66.
Census of 1920, Descriptive Report, Appendix, Tables 51 and 52.
Census of 1930, Statistical Tables, Total Island, Tables 45 and 46.

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TABLE 25
PROPORTIONS OF TAIWAN'S POPULATION OF EACH ETHNIC GROUP Living Inside the Nine Major Cities in Taiwan, and in Taipei City

	1920		*1940*	
	Per Cent of Total Population	*Sex Ratios*	*Per Cent of Total Population*	*Sex Ratios*
Nine Cities Combined				
Taiwanese	10.5	106	14.7	104
Japanese	60.2	119	65.6	105
Other	68.4	345	59.8	175
Taipei City Alone				
Taiwanese	3.1	102	4.0	99
Japanese	27.5	117	29.3	100
Other	38.6	364	26.8	166

Source: *Census of 1930, Statistical Tables*, Table 1.

geous for conducting the new activities that they brought with them to Taiwan. Japanese proceeded to develop Taiwan's cities to provide an appropriate environment of modern banking facilities, centers of government administration, reservoirs of professional skills, and headquarters of private business.

Personal comforts, too, were not neglected. Running water, systems of sewage disposal, gas, electricity, and cinemas first appeared in these cities, and did not spread far beyond them. For those who could afford the time and expense, life in Taipei was graced by a nearby golf course and several fashionable vacation resorts. Japanese were energetic in constructing large public buildings conspicuously of Western architectural styles, thoroughfares and parks for their gratification and diversion. The section of Taichung City that was occupied by Japanese was referred to fondly as "little Kyoto."[13] Cities understandably were attractive places for Japanese to reside.

The Japanese affinity for urban life was exceeded only among the mainland Chinese that were found in Taiwan.[14] The explanation in their case is somewhat different. These people were admitted to the island as small merchants or as laborers in many of the modern enterprises that flourished wherever there were Japanese. In this respect they were distinct from Taiwanese, as their occupational composition indicates (see Table 16). Otherwise they merged in language, customs, and sympathies most closely with the urban population of Taiwanese.

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[13] OPNAV, Civil Affairs Handbook (1944). *Taichu Province*, p. 149 ff.

[14] These made up almost all of the category "Other Nationalities" in Table 25 and in published census tables.

The Chinese tended to remain in cities or commercial towns. The authorities held them under suspicion and close scrutiny, and often confined them by labor contract to menial positions. On the whole they did not become permanent residents of Taiwan; by their sex ratios they appear as a relatively transient group (though some of them intermarried with Taiwanese). Many were merely seasonal workers who remained in Taiwan for only part of the year.

The ethnic composition of the urban population was, like its increase, a product of migration from outside cities rather than growth from within. Different cities did not all exert the same attraction for people according to ethnic background. Variations between cities in ethnic composition (see Table 26) were scarcely a matter of *Taiwanese* being drawn less into some cities than into others, for they comprised the broad population base in every one. These differ-

TABLE 26

ETHNIC COMPOSITION OF MAJOR CITIES IN TAIWAN

Per Cent of Total Population in Each Ethnic Group
1920, 1930 and 1940

	Taiwanese			*Japanese*			*Others*		
*Cities**	*1920*	*1930*	*1940*	*1920*	*1930*	*1940*	*1920*	*1930*	*1940*
Taipei	66.4	64.1	67.9	27.8	29.4	28.1	5.8	6.6	4.1
Chilung	70.3	68.4	69.5	24.8	24.7	24.8	4.9	6.9	5.7
Hsinchu	90.7	87.4	86.3	8.3	11.3	12.7	1.1	1.2	1.0
Taichung	70.5	72.8	78.9	28.0	24.4	19.8	1.5	2.8	1.3
Changhua	97.0	93.6	94.0	2.3	4.5	5.1	.7	1.9	.9
Tainan	81.1	80.5	86.0	15.9	15.8	11.7	3.0	3.7	2.3
Chiayi	83.8	82.3	87.4	14.5	14.8	10.8	1.7	2.9	1.8
Kaohsiung	74.1	72.2	79.8	24.1	24.6	18.6	1.8	3.2	1.6
P'ingtung	84.2	82.8	85.8	14.2	13.8	12.3	1.6	3.4	1.9
Total	75.9	73.9	78.0	20.6	21.5	19.2	3.5	4.5	2.8

* Boundaries of all cities have been adjusted to those of 1935.

Sources: *1920 Population Register*, Table 2.
Census of 1930, Statistical Tables, Tables 1 and 2.
Census of 1935, Statistical Tables, Table 1.

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ences are to be explained primarily by the preferences of Japanese for certain cities as opposed to others.[15]

We may thus regard the proportion of Japanese in the population as the major element in the variation between cities. The ethnic composition of each city was remarkably stable from 1920 to 1940, though almost all doubled in population. Taipei, Chilung, Taichung, and Kaohsiung were all more than one-fifth Japanese at each census date. This is least surprising in the case of Taipei, for it was the administrative hub of the entire island, and a thriving center of foreign trade as well. Chilung because of its natural harbor became established early as the principal port of access to and from Japan. It kept this position even after the harbor no longer handled heavy traffic, by possessing some of the key industries intended to complement Japan's war effort. Taichung was in the fertile middle section of the island, and prospered enormously from the collecting, processing, and marketing of agricultural produce. Kaohsiung was the center from which the Japanese mounted their most extensive efforts at modernization: in the city itself and its immediate environs were concentrated the major processing industries of the island. Large sums were spent in improving its harbor to facilitate the passage of this new production out of the island.[16]

The remaining five Municipalities were more typically Chinese in atmosphere, with the alien features of Japanese presence kept more in the background. Whatever their types, these cities of Taiwan were the most important places where Japanese residents mingled with Taiwanese. Japanese nationals were scattered over the rest of the island in administrative and technical posts, public and private, but only in these cities did they associate regularly with Taiwanese. Only there did many Taiwanese who were non-farmers come into frequent contact with Japanese. Consequently, one would expect that the urban environment was the principal channel of modern influence.

Even in these cities there were certain obstacles in the way of such contact. The barrier was not entirely one of language, for Taiwanese soon acquired the rudiments of the Japanese tongue through school-

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[15] Mainland Chinese varied almost as much as their share in the total population by city. But they were so few, and their stay in Taiwan so impermanent, that they cannot be considered a very important part of even the urban population.

[16] Kaohsiung City was also built up as a base for southward expansion in the Pacific Ocean, but did not have the opportunity to fulfill the promise of this investment.

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ing and practice. Japanese did many things to discourage free intercourse between the two groups, and raised exaggerated fears of animosity from the Taiwanese among their own kind.[17]

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The Japanese maintained high levels of living in Taiwan. Their wealth did not create the separation between the two groups, but helped to enlarge it. The opulence of Japanese was more than simply a matter of superior income (which the Taiwanese might have emulated); it was also founded on privilege.

For example, wherever possible they lived apart in special portions of each city. These sections were arranged so as to provide the facilities that they were in a position to command—Japanese shops, entertainment, and cleanliness, one of the greatest of all luxuries in Asia. Influential Japanese strove to put themselves in such surroundings, whereupon they allowed poorer sections to develop as Taiwanese residents could best afford. Owing to this combination of jealous care and neglect, the central districts of most cities were elaborately laid out with efficient street patterns and handsome landscapes—but with residential finery and modern public buildings concentrated in a few blocks and the indescribable slums that Asia often produces spread over the remainder.[18]

It is easy to see the nature of residential segregation in Taipei City, where it was carried farthest (see Fig. 20, based on 1935 census data). There were two large concentrations of Taiwanese, at the north and the southeast corners. These were the sites of the original pair of settlements that grew into the present city. The space in between had been gradually built up before 1895 as the seat of Manchu administration for the island. It was razed and replaced by the Japanese (following a destructive typhoon in 1912) to make way for new construction that they planned. The Japanese built this central area themselves, and therefore to their own design. It had a core in which almost none but Japanese eventually lived, surrounded by a

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[17] One can say that these fears were exaggerated without implying that they were without foundation. By their repressive administration, Japanese invited widespread ill-will in the population. Much of this might have been allayed if they had not on the one hand advertised the benefits of their rule and, on the other, systematically cut off any opportunities for Taiwanese to compete with Japanese on equal footing. This ambivalent policy even undermined some of their foremost objectives by impeding their use of the local labor supply in the most effective ways for war production.

[18] The enforcement of health and sanitary regulations held the two groups in complete equality before the law. In looking back at the severity of these measures, Chinese have remembered them as instances of oppression by the Japanese. But by such means the authorities were able to avoid the unhealthful conditions usually associated with urban crowding in Asia. See Hsü Tze-wei (1946), p. 444 ff.

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
PER CENT OF JAPANESE IN TOTAL POPULATION,
BY WARDS, TAIPEI CITY, 1935
BELOW 50%
0-9.9
10-49.9
ABOVE 50%
50-89.9
90-100
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Fig. 20. Residential Segregation of Japanese in Taipei City.

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substantial area where Japanese residents predominated. Around the fringes of this modern district, other Japanese (reportedly those of lower income and social status[18]) lived more thinly mixed with Taiwanese. Almost one-half of the city's surface was taken up by poorer districts composed entirely of Taiwanese dwellings, shops, and open markets.

There is also another way to see how the separation of living quarters kept the two groups apart—in terms of persons rather than the space involved. Table 27 illustrates this aspect of segregation for

[18] OPNAV, Civil Affairs Handbook (1944), *Taihoku Province*, p. 133. A more comprehensive account of the growth of Taipei City, in relation to the surrounding region, is given in Ch'en Cheng-hsiang (1952).

TABLE 27

RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION IN TAIPEI CITY, 1925 AND 193

Taiwanese and Japanese Population Distributed by the Proportion Japanese in Each "Ward"

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Per Cent Japanese in Each Ward	*1925*		*1935*	
	Number	*Per Cent of Total*	*Number*	*Per Cent of Total*
		Taiwanese		
0– 9.9	94,551	73.4	109,309	62.5
10.0– 49.9	25,681	19.9	48,815	27.9
50.0– 89.9	7,964	6.2	16,508	9.4
90.0–100.0	606	0.5	384	0.2
Total Taiwanese	128,802	100.0	175,016	100.0
		Japanese		
0– 9.9	3,069	5.8	3,640	4.5
10.0– 49.9	11,462	21.5	18,173	22.2
50.0– 89.9	24,926	46.7	48,775	59.7
90.0–100.0	13,884	26.0	11,116	13.6
Total Japanese	53,341	100.0	81,704	100.0

Sources: *Census of 1925, Statistical Tables*, Table 2.
Census of 1935, Statistical Tables, Table 2.

Taipei City in 1925 and 1935. Here both Taiwanese and Japanese have been grouped according to the degree of concentration of Japanese in each "ward." While the non-Japanese wards held the bulk of Taiwanese, there was some considerable area of overlap where the two groups were relatively mixed. From the evidence of this table, many Japanese who were arriving in Taiwan were forced to go to residential areas that contained some Taiwanese residents. This is shown by the relative gain of Japanese in the sections that were not purely Japanese, but where Japanese residents were in the majority. With its members increasing, the Japanese community eventually had to mix more widely with Taiwanese, since the areas that were already more than 90 per cent Japanese could not absorb any newcomers. They moved into wards with only the "better element" of Taiwanese, however, and managed to keep this mixture to a minimum. The proportion of Japanese living in predominantly Taiwanese wards actually fell off very slightly.

From the Taiwanese side, moving into mixed sections was carried somewhat further. Taiwanese were beginning to spread into wards that were not purely Taiwanese, sections closer to the center of the

563 city which they had occupied together with Japanese. Because there
were more of them, and because they had been more concentrated
361 among their own kind before, the Taiwanese moving into these
areas contributed more to the mixture than the Japanese. The data
162 here do not signify that it was very extensive. But it makes some difference which of these two aspects of segregation we choose to use as a standard of comparison.

This trend in the segregation of urban residents was of some significance in the other cities during the years when they were growing rapidly, for the system was put under strain by the continuous arrival of new immigrants. On the whole, the Japanese were successful in housing most of their people in residential wards that were predominantly Japanese, and well-to-do Taiwanese were moderately successful in entering sections containing some Japanese, but not into the sections most prized by the Japanese.

For Japanese, no other city offered living quarters and facilities so exclusive as those of Taipei (see Table 28). In every one of these six other Municipalities they lived more widely intermixed with Taiwanese (though not necessarily at the same levels of comfort). Kao-

TABLE 28

RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION IN SIX CITIES OF TAIWAN, 1935

Taiwanese and Japanese Population Distributed by the Proportion Japanese of Each Ward

Per Cent Japanese in Each Ward	*Chilung*	*Hsinchu*	*Taichung*	*Tainan*	*Chiayi*	*Kaohsiung*
				Taiwanese		
0– 9.9	56.6	68.5	52.7	50.0	58.2	56.1
10.0– 49.9	34.2	30.7	42.7	48.3	41.5	36.2
50.0– 89.9	8.9	0.7	4.5	1.7	0.3	7.7
90.0–100.0	0.3	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0
Total Taiwanese	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
				Japanese		
0– 9.9	5.7	16.4	6.8	11.0	15.7	7.9
10.0– 49.9	35.6	54.3	53.0	69.9	80.0	38.6
50.0– 89.9	50.9	16.6	34.9	11.1	4.3	53.5
90.0–100.0	7.8	12.7	5.3	8.0	0.0	0.0
Total Japanese	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: *Census of 1935, Statistical Tables*, Table 2.

52:Barclay S-5 (nodate)1954 AD1 Formosa AD1

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hsiung and Chiayi had not a single ward with as high as 90 per cent of its population Japanese. For Taiwanese, on the other hand, Taipei consisted neither more nor less of mixed wards than the other cities. In all, at least nine-tenths of the Taiwanese population of every city stayed in districts in which less than a majority of the inhabitants were Japanese.

The Taiwanese in Cities

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Of all Taiwanese, so few went to cities that one is prompted to ask whether there were not some special factors present restricting the size of this migration. The effects of such a selective process over many years should produce differences in the characteristics of persons living in cities and of those living outside.

Since few if any newcomers had an opportunity to take up agriculture in the cities, a prominent feature of cityward migration was a movement to new work. To the extent that it was, one would expect that the migrants were the types of persons who usually undertook new occupations in Taiwan—for example, men rather than women, primarily in the ages of young adulthood. If the migrant population had been limited to these categories, cities with large proportions of migrants in their populations must have had disproportionate numbers of young men as compared with the rest of the island. Such a tendency has characterized rapid urbanization elsewhere.

In addition, cities frequently offer opportunities for employment that are considered superior to those found in the countryside. This is especially true of many agrarian societies, where rural poverty sometimes reaches extremes that make the meanest of urban jobs seem attractive. Where such conditions exist, movement to cities very often serves to drain off large numbers of men in young working ages who have lost or overcome their attachment to farming.

In 1935, these effects of age and sex selection were hardly perceptible in Taiwan's urban population taken as a whole. The age composition of all their males combined was nearly the same as the rural population (Table 29). Surprisingly, urban females likewise had almost the same age structure as those outside of cities. Hence, there could have been no sweeping dislocation of persons of different age and sex groups as a result of urbanization in Taiwan.

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There are special circumstances in which it is not hard to imagine some movement of single individuals in an agrarian society; this has

52:Barclay S-5 (nodate)1954 AD1 Formosa AD1

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TABLE 31

INTER-CITY DIFFERENCES IN OCCUPATIONAL COMPOSITION

Per Cent of Occupied Males in Selected Types of Occupation in Each of Seven Municipalities, 1930
All Nationality Groups

Cities	*Manufacturing*	*Commerce*	*Transportation*	*Government*	*Agriculture*	*Other Occupations*
Taipei	26	30	10	18	6	10
Chilung	16	21	23	9	4	27
Hsinchu	21	25	10	13	20	11
Taichung	23	28	10	19	14	6
Tainan	28	28	13	18	5	8
Chiayi	22	29	10	12	20	7
Kaohsiung	24	19	20	11	13	13
Total Seven Cities	24	27	13	15	9	12

Source: *Census of 1930, Statistical Tables,* Table 40.

divisions from rural conditions. Nevertheless, large blocs of Taiwan's urban population still supported themselves by farming. Only three Municipalities in 1930 had as few as one-twentieth of their working males engaged in agriculture. It is small wonder that these cities had failed to show symptoms of advanced urbanism in other respects.

Other types of employment in these cities also had certain special features. Government administration in Taipei, transshipping of seaport cargoes in Chilung and Kaohsiung, and sugar processing in Taichung and Tainan were reflected as important activities in their share of all male employment. These figures, pertaining to 1930, reveal nothing of the intensified industrial activity in these cities in the succeeding decade. They are the only available indication in demographic terms of the peculiarities of individual cities. In any event, we are less interested in these peculiar elements than in the relations between types of employment and urban settlement among Taiwanese. Since Table 31 does not show Taiwanese separately, it is affected by differences in the proportions of Japanese and in their work among the various cities. Hence the information, while illuminating, is less useful than one might wish.

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More information is available for the population of all seven cities combined. By means of some estimation, we can find the occupational

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TABLE 32
OCCUPATIONAL COMPOSITION IN CITIES OF TAIWAN BY ETHNIC GROUP, 1930*
Distribution of Occupied Males by Occupation and Nationality

	Taiwanese	*Japanese*	*Other Nationalities*
A. Per Cents by Occupation			
Agriculture	13.1	0.9	0.2
Fishing	2.1	2.2	0.5
Mining	2.1	0.2	1.1
Manufacturing	22.8	18.6	43.8
Commerce	29.1	19.6	27.8
Transportation	13.7	10.2	19.1
Govt. & Prof.	6.4	44.4	3.3
Other	10.7	3.9	4.2
Total Occupied	100.0	100.0	100.0
Per Cent Occupied of All Males	54.4	58.0	76.8
B. Per Cents by Ethnic Group			
Agriculture	97.5	2.4	0.1
Fishing	70.8	27.2	2.0
Mining	89.9	3.8	6.[illegible]
Manufacturing	65.0	19.0	16.0
Commerce	73.2	17.8	9.0
Transportation	69.1	18.5	12.4
Govt. & Prof.	28.2	70.0	1.8
Other	84.7	11.1	4.2
Total Occupied	67.4	24.0	8.6

* Includes the seven cities of Municipal rank in 1930.
Source: Estimated from *Census of 1930, Statistical Tables*, Table 39.

composition of each ethnic group separately (Table 32).[21] Taking account only of males with occupation, these data represent the urban Taiwanese at less of a disadvantage next to the Japanese than was true over the entire island. Of course, one must remember that Taiwanese (and Mainland Chinese) in the same type of work with Jap-

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[21] The necessity to "estimate" arises because the occupational data *by ethnic groups* were given in "Occupation" units (i.e., persons with a principal occupation plus persons with a secondary occupation), and counted some persons twice. In the tables shown here, the ethnic composition of "Occupations" has been applied to the total of persons (males) in each occupation.

162 463 563 anese usually had subordinate positions. Nevertheless, it seems conclusive that by moving into cities Taiwanese were able to narrow the gap that separated their forms of livelihood from those of the Japanese.

The ethnic composition of occupied persons (appended to Table 32) indicates how the differences in occupational structure among these ethnic groups were weighted in the urban population. Taiwanese, of course, predominated in all lines except in government service and professional activities. Keeping these coveted positions in their own hands was one of the ways in which Japanese were able to live side by side with the rest of the population and avoid the pressure of competition.

Chinese nationals ("Other Nationalities" in Table 32) in these cities also appeared in a few types of work far more than in the working population as a whole. Their specialties were of an opposite kind: many worked as laborers in small manufacturing enterprises and as longshoremen, accounting for their large share of all "Manufacturing" and "Transportation" workers.

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TABLE 33

OCCUPATIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF TAIWANESE MALES
REPORTING AN OCCUPATION,
INSIDE AND OUTSIDE MAJOR CITIES, 1905, 1920, 1930

	1905		1920		1930	
	*Inside**	*Outside*	*Inside†*	*Outside*	*Inside‡*	*Outside*
Agriculture	2.3	72.1	13.2	71.9	13.1	74.0
Fishing	.6	2.9	1.2	2.3	2.1	2.0
Mining	28.4	5.4	1.1	1.4	2.1	1.3
Manufacturing			27.1	6.9	22.8	5.9
Commerce	37.7	6.4	28.9	6.4	29.1	8.2
Transportation	10.4	1.9	11.2	2.8	13.7	2.8
Govt. & Prof.	5.6	1.7	6.7	1.9	6.4	2.3
Other	15.0	9.6	10.6	6.4	10.7	3.5
Total Occup.	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

* Comprises the cities of Taipei, Taichung, and Tainan. The boundaries for Taipei in this tabulation were smaller than the city as subsequently organized.

† Cities of Taipei, Taichung, and Tainan, with the same boundaries used at later census dates.

‡ Cities of Taipei, Chilung, [illegible], Taichung, Tainan, Chiayi, Kaohsiung.

Sources: *Census of 1905, Detailed Tables, Prefectural Volume*, Table 17.
Census of 1920, Prefectural Volume, Table 16.
Census of 1930, Statistical Tables, Table 39.

592 162 households were not keeping up with the increase of people, and that family groups were therefore undergoing some change in their composition. Though some aspects of this change can be shown more satisfactorily below, the process is most easily seen in these figures, since they cover the complete span of the census administration.

162 128 As usual, the published results of these census materials did not do justice to the care that went into their collection. Household tables were not always shown in useful form, and the figures of Table 43 do not convey very much even about the size of families in Taiwan. Obviously in order to draw reliable conclusions about families of Taiwanese it must be possible to separate them as a group in the statistics, and to make sure that the statistics employed are a fair representation of family groups. For exactly this purpose, the Japanese treated one kind of household as standard, the so-called "ordinary" household, to cover the "normal" types of living arrangements. People in certain special categories were excluded; residents of these non-family households, or "quasi-households," will be omitted from most of the tables that follow.[a]

162 592 563 Information about quasi-households is sketchy and hard to find. The size of these establishments is unknown for separate nationality groups, perhaps through a deliberate effort to conceal the military forces (though they would nearly all have been classified as Japanese anyway, according to the status of the person in charge). The figures can be pieced together for the entire population, and appear in Tables 44 and 45. Quasi-households were a very small part of the total, but accounted for a much larger portion of non-Taiwanese. Only one person in a hundred of all nationality groups lived in such circumstances; 6.6 per cent of Japanese and 20 per cent of Mainland Chinese lived in quasi-households in 1930, but relatively few of the Taiwanese were found outside of ordinary households. Since Taiwanese are the main source of interest in the problem, the few living in quasi-households are unimportant, and for the remainder of this chapter the term "household" will be used to refer to "ordinary" households only.

On the average, ordinary households of Taiwanese contained be-

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[a] They comprise people counted in hospitals, prisons, schools, military barracks, police and other special dormitories, and hotels. Although they must be removed before the household data can be said to represent patterns of familial life, the line drawn between the two types of household is not entirely rigorous. Many of these people, especially the ones in hotels and schools, were only temporarily absent from their homes, and their family affiliations may have continued undiminished.

52: Barclay S-5 (no date) 1954 AD1 Formosa AD1

TABLE 44

PER CENT OF TAIWAN'S POPULATION LIVING IN "ORDINARY" HOUSEHOLDS, 1905-1930

Both Sexes

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Year	*Persons Living in Ordinary Households*	*Persons Living in "Quasi-Households"*	*Per Cent Living in Ordinary Households*
	All Nationality Groups		
1905	3,021,260	18,491	99.4
1915	3,461,282	18,640	99.5
1920	3,624,403	30,905	99.2
1930	4,546,970	45,567	99.0
	Taiwanese		
1920	3,454,956	11,551	99.7
1930	4,293,234	20,447	99.5
	Japanese		
1920	151,862	12,404	92.4
1930	213,314	14,967	93.4
	Other Nationalities*		
1920	17,585	6,950	71.7
1930	40,422	10,153	79.9

* "Other nationalities" consists almost entirely of Mainland Chinese.

Sources: *Census of 1905, General Volume of Statistical Tables*, Table 114.
Census of 1915, Statistical Tables, Table 109 and 116.
Census of 1920, Descriptive Report with Appendix, Appendix Table 149, 164, 165 and 169.
Census of 1930, Statistical Tables, Total Island, Table 5.

tween five and six persons during that portion of the census period when they can be observed separately. Because Taiwanese made up almost the entire population and because most of them lived in family groups, the initial approximation of Table 43 was fairly close to the actual size of their households. Differences begin to emerge when other nationality groups are listed by themselves; the households of both Japanese and Mainland Chinese on the average were smaller by a considerable margin than those of the Taiwanese, and remained that way (see Table 45).

Not only did Taiwanese follow the ideal of large households more closely than the other population groups in Taiwan, but they displayed a different pattern in approaching it. Distributed according to the number of persons in each, only the households of Taiwanese

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TABLE 45

SIZE OF HOUSEHOLDS, BY TYPE AND NATIONALITY OF HEAD

Average Persons Per Household, "Ordinary" Households and "Quasi-Households"
All Nationality Groups, Taiwanese, Japanese and Other Nationalities
1905 to 1930

Year	*Ordinary Households*	*Quasi-Households*
	All Nationality Groups	
1905	5.19	6.2
1915	5.31	12.4
1920	5.30	20.6
1930	5.64	17.1
	Taiwanese	
1920	5.45	
1930	5.82	
	Japanese	
1920	3.37	
1930	3.74	
	Other Nationalities*	
1920	3.79	
1930	3.84	

* "Other nationalities" consists almost entirely of Mainland Chinese.

Source: From data of preceding table. Certain army and navy barracks were included as quasi-households in the Census of 1920 for the first time, accounting for much of the increase over 1915 and 1905 in the average size of quasi-households shown above.

were in a pattern that reveals a predominance of families with two or more generations, families of the sort that must be required to maintain a high rate of natural increase. Their households were found most commonly with four and five members, more rarely of smaller sizes. The process by which the average size of Taiwanese households rose from 1905 on was not a completely general shift toward larger units, but rather one of forming relatively fewer small households (with the exception of people living alone) and raising the proportion of very large ones (see Fig. 30). The sizes most often achieved remained very nearly the same as before, and the distribution simply became more skewed. (Expressed in terms of the numbers of persons involved, the effect of this change would, of course,

52:Barclay S-5 (nodate)1954 AD1 Formosa AD1

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

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Fig. 30. Size of Households in Taiwan at Various Dates. Households Distributed by the Number of Persons in Each. Taiwanese, Japanese and Others.

592 be multiplied in households of larger size, since they were larger by virtue of containing many people.)

563 162 A great many Japanese and Chinese nationals staying in Taiwan obviously were separated from close family ties—for example, those who lived alone, and perhaps some of those in households of two or three persons, not to mention the ones who stayed in quasi-households. Few in either group maintained households in Taiwan as large as those that were usual among their countrymen at home. The Japanese gradually began to establish families in Taiwan, and to take up solitary living somewhat less frequently than at the beginning of their rule. In contrast, an extremely high proportion (29 per cent) of Chinese from the mainland by 1930 were still living alone in households of single persons, a result of the transient and impermanent status that they occupied in the island. It is interesting that in both of these minority groups, households of more than five persons, though not very numerous, had a distribution less unlike those of the Taiwanese. Apparently among the more settled and permanent non-Taiwanese in the population the ideals of the desirable family size were similar to those of the Taiwanese; but this attitude seems to have been more widely shared by Taiwanese, who as a group came closer to realizing it.

Composition of Taiwanese Households

592 It is not size in itself that distinguishes the Chinese family system from its counterparts in other countries. Nor does it mean a great deal to know about the size of family or household groups—even when we know their distribution from large to small—unless something can be discovered about their composition. Kinship would not be such a preoccupation in the minds of Chinese if it did not include other things that we have accustomed ourselves to regard as "non-familial." All that the factor of size indicates is the extent to which diverse familial roles can be encompassed within household units. In ascertaining these more diverse activities that were carried on in Taiwanese households, it will be helpful to find out some of the various kinds of members that were present.

The census schedules made inquiry into the family relationship of each household member, reckoned with reference to the head of the household. When the person was not a relative of the head, some further statement was still required—whether hired help, domestic servant, or simply a "lodger" in the house. The trouble is that the

647 ment employees was reduced to 81,006, while the percentage of indigenous citizens in government service had risen to 65.46. A more significant change, perhaps, is in the increase of indigenous personnel in positions of responsibility. Among the first-class officials, local personnel has increased from 0.92 per cent under the Japanese to 17.45 per cent under the Nationalists. During the similar period, the second-class officials of indigenous origin rose from 1.29 per cent to 25.02 per cent.

563 Of 113,900 aborigines in Taiwan, 91,070 of them live in the central moun-
657 tainous region. Since 1946 they have been exempted from tax payments. Redistricted into a number of villages and subvillages, they have been developing local self-government through village assemblies. There are at present 159 free primary schools among them, educating some 20,000 of their children. In addition, 924 graduates have been awarded government scholarships to enter secondary schools. Among them are also 140 public health clinics serviced by 321 medical people.[18]

FINANCE

652 The people of Taiwan suffered much when their currency was linked with that of mainland China. From one Taiwan dollar for thirty Chinese dollars (*fapi*) in 1946, the rate climbed to T$1,835 for one Chinese "Gold Yuan" in August 1948.[19] By the time the Gold Yuan collapsed several months later, there was little purchasing power left in the Taiwan dollar worth salvaging. A fresh start was made in June 1949 when the

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nel figures on which this analysis is based, see *Taiwan Today*, cited note 11 *supra*, pp. 30–31.

[18] For figures in this paragraph, see *Taiwan Reconstruction**, cited note 12 *supra*, Vol. 1, pp. 20–21.

[19] For a general description of Taiwan provincial finance, see *Taiwan Reconstruction**, pp. 33–77; also cf. *Taiwan Today*, cited note 11 *supra*, pp. 44–76.

[E, 216 (B)]